FORUM ARTIS RHETORICAE

pod redakcją
Jakuba Z. Lichańskiego

Rhetoric and conflict
Retoryka i konflikt

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Volume Editor/Redaktor numeru Agnieszka Budzyńska-Daca

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RHETORIC AND CONFLICT

The volume dedicated to the rhetorical study of conflict and argumentation in dispute is a continuation of research ideas presented in this year's first issue of Forum Artis Rhetoricae. This time the authors turn their attention towards politics, academic discourse and eristic.

The first article *Eristic and dispute – applications and interpretations* by Agnieszka Budzyńska-Daca deals with the contemporary conceptualization of eristic and problems associated with the interpretation of arguments involved in dispute. The author presents classical and contemporary definitions of eristic with a particular emphasis on their differences. This lack of conceptual uniformity results in problems with interpretation of the concept of eristic and its manifestations in communication.

The volume includes two texts related to American presidential rhetoric. Both of them are dedicated to the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In Anna Bendrat's *The dispute as a political spectacle: a rhetorical actio during the Cold War* the international conflict takes the form of a media performance. The analyzed example concerns the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The author argues that Reagan's decision about the intervention of the small Pacific island did not reflect the direct threat to the political and economic interests of America, but from the outset was intended to create a media spectacle. Marta Rzepecka in *Ronald Reagan: Language and Ideology* presents the analysis of selected examples of the President's Cold War rhetoric. The author discusses the rhetorical tools used in these texts, which create the atmosphere of the Cold War. The selected speeches demonstrate Reagan's personal contribution to the escalation of the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Politics and public sphere are also explored by Barbara Sobczak in her study on *The rhetoric of reconciliation*. The author discusses the functioning of opposition and consensus in the public discourse. The author enumerates the criteria which allow for the existence of rhetoric of reconciliation in public communication. They are: "1) a given rhetorical situation that consist of an issue, a conflict situation that can be either viewed as something that has existed forever and therefore underlies the sources of any relation, or is treated as only a stage in the history of a relation that occurred after a time of agreement and unity; 2) the opening to dialogue that requires primarily self-definition, a definition of one's

identity, demarcating boundaries and then, acknowledging the individuality (uniqueness) of the Other. 3) the language of empathy for reducing the degree of defensiveness in reaching an agreement; 4) the ethos of the speaker, based on knowledge, friendliness and openness."

Iga Lechman provides insight into a completely different, non-political area. Her article *Rhetorical Approaches to Academic Writing: the Case of Polish and Anglo-American Academic Writing* relates to academic writing in which the author sees the need to address the potential problem of dispute and its current conditions. The author reveals the lack of uniform standards and norms for the composition of academic texts in Polish and Anglo-American traditions. This leads to difficulties in academic communication and creates problems in the process of socialization of students in the rhetorical conventions of their disciplines.

The research proposals presented in this volume analyze the issue of conflict and argumentation in dispute from different perspectives: starting from eristic through political intentions inherent in the conflict to the methodology of dispute avoidance, both in public life and in academic activity. We hope that this research will inspire further exploration of the rhetorical nature of dispute or / and "disputed" nature of rhetoric.

Agnieszka Budzyńska-Daca
Volume Editor

RETORYKA I KONFLIKT

Tom tematyczny poświęcony retorycznym badaniom konfliktu i argumentacji spornej jest kontynuacją idei realizowanej w pierwszym tegorocznym numerze FAR. Na warsztat badaczek trafiły zagadnienia z obszaru polityki, pisarstwa naukowego i erystyki.

Pierwszy tekst *Erystyka i spór. Aplikacje i interpretacje* autorstwa piszącej te słowa, dotyczy dzisiejszych konceptualizacji erystyki i problemów związanych z interpretacją argumentacji uwikłanej w spór. Przedstawione zostały klasyczne i współczesne definicje przedmiotu, różnice między nimi i wynikające stąd konsekwencje z interpretacji koncepcji erystyki i przejawów erystyczności w komunikowaniu.

W tomie znalazły się dwa teksty, które dotyczą obszaru amerykańskiej retoryki prezydenckiej. Obydwa poświęcone są postaci Ronalda Reagana. W artykule Anny Bendrat *The dispute as a political spectacle: a rhetorical actio during the Cold War* pokazany został problem politycznego sporu, który uzyskał formę medialnego spektaklu. Analizowany przykład dotyczy inwazji na Grenadę (1983) dokonanej z inicjatywy Reagana. Autorka dowodzi, iż interwencja Stanów Zjednoczonych na Grenadzie nie wynikała z bezpośredniej konieczności obrony interesów polityczno-ekonomicznych, lecz z potencjału tego sporu do stworzenia medialnego spektaklu. Artykuł Marty Rzepeckiej *Ronald Reagan: Language and Ideology* przedstawia na wybranych przykładach analizę retoryki zimnej wojny prezydenta Reagana. Autorka omawia narzędzia retoryczne użyte w tych tekstach, które kreują atmosferę zimnowojenną. Pokazuje osobisty wkład prezydenta w eskalację konfliktu.

Do obszaru polityki i życia publicznego sięga też Barbara Sobczak, pisząc o „retoryce pojednania". Autorka podejmuje problematykę funkcjonowania w dyskursie publicznym porozumienia i szukania konsensusu. Wymienia kryteria, które pozwalają zaistnieć tzw. retoryce pojednania w komunikacji publicznej. Są to: „1) określona sytuacja retoryczna – sytuacja konfliktu, który może być postrzegany jako to, co istniało od zawsze, a zatem leży u źródeł jakichś relacji, albo traktowany jest tylko jako etap w historii relacji, który nastąpił po czasie zgody i jedności; 2) otwarcie na dialog, który wymaga w pierwszej kolejności określenia siebie, swojej tożsamości, wytyczenia granic i dalej – uznania odrębności Innego; 3) język empatii, pozwalający zredukować stopień defensywności

w dochodzeniu do porozumienia.; 4) etos mówcy, oparty na wiedzy, życzliwości i otwartości."

Zupełnie inny, niepolityczny obszar eksploruje Iga Lechman. Jej artykuł *Rhetorical Approaches to Academic Writing: the Case of Polish and Anglo-American Academic Writing* dotyczy pisarstwa naukowego. Tu widzi Autorka potrzebę zwrócenia uwagi na potencjalny problem sporu i aktualne jego uwarunkowania. Ujawnia brak jednakowych norm i standardów dotyczących kompozycji tekstów akademickich w tradycji polskiej i anglo-amerykańskiej. Co prowadzić ma do utrudnień w komunikacji akademickiej oraz problemów w procesie socjalizacji studentów w retorycznych konwencjach ich dyscyplin naukowych.

Przedstawione propozycje badawcze ujmują problem konfliktu i argumentacji spornej z różnych perspektyw, od erystycznej metody, przez polityczne intencje rozgrywania konfliktu, po metodykę unikania sporu, tak w życiu publicznym, jak i działalności naukowej. Mamy nadzieję, że badania te będą inspiracją dla dalszych poszukiwań retorycznej natury sporu albo/i „spornej" natury retoryki.

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ERISTIC AND DISPUTE – APPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

The article addresses the problem of eristic and its modern conceptualizations. The author juxtaposes the concepts of Aristotle, Schopenhauer and Kotarbiński pointing to differences in their approaches to the art of dispute. The outcome indicates that there should be a distinction between eristic in the classical sense and in the sense of a new eristic. A new approach to eristic would correspond to the area of rhetoric which Wayne Booth calls Win-Rhetoric. The perspective different from Aristotle's is also developed by some Russian authors (Rożdestvenskij, Blaževič, Selivanov). The author argues that the interpreter's unambiguous declaration of adopting one of the two concepts of eristic is a prerequisite for a more adequate analysis of its manifestations (argumentative strategies and problems in the sphere of ethics) in communicative interactions.

Key words: eristic, Aristotle, Kotarbiński, Schopenhauer, Win-Rhetoric

Introduction

The rhetoric of dispute may be considered at several levels of communication: public (political disputes), professional (business and trade negotiations, mediation), and private (disputes with family or neighbours). Dispute may also be regarded through the lens of specific modes and purposes of communication: the rules of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation. Finally, the proceedings of dispute will vary depending on the choice of the argumentative "methodology" relevant to the objectives set by the participants. These objectives generally stem from a rhetorical situation. Methodology will therefore involve either dialectic or rhetoric or eristic. The objectives of the participants depend on whether dispute is carried out in public and thus is designed for a specific audience or if it takes place in a private space where the participants simultaneously serve as auditoriums. This in turn has an influence both on the hierarchy of participants' objectives and on the choice of a rhetorical genre.

In this article dispute is discussed from the perspective of eristic due to eristic's primary focus on dispute and the narrowest range of dispute-specific methodological tools. By contrast, dialectic and rhetoric encompass broader spheres of communication (research investigation, discussion, negotiation, persuasive dialogue, conversation, etc.) and they both recognize the types of interactions other than dispute. To illustrate the complexity of the problem, let us formulate several important (rhetorical) questions:

What is eristic? What is its relationship with the techniques of communication? Is eristic a mere collection of argumentative fraud, tricks, errors and fallacies? (This would be the understanding according to the neo-Aristotelian tradition). Or is it the strategy of dispute – as some modern scholars claim – structuring the methodology of argument use? Is naming dispute "eristic" derogative? If so, what are the criteria? Do the arguments used in the dispute become eristic because of the intentionality of their use? When can someone's behavior and argument be called eristic? Is it when they are based on the assumption of victory in dispute? Or is it rather when the participant(s) use arguments commonly regarded as fallacious? And if participants do rely on the assumptions of victory but do not use the arguments referred to as fallacious – can we still call their argumentation eristic? Does the frequency of using fallacies in dispute play a role in regarding someone's argument as eristic? If so, what should be the balance between logically efficient and flawed reasoning to consider it eristic? Is the quality of fallacies important to label someone's argument eristic?

A separate list of questions could apply to the nature of relationships between rhetoric, dialectic and eristic: Is eristic a component of both rhetoric and dialectic? For, after all, a rhetorical stasis theory provides for the construction and the analysis of dispute (whereas dispute itself is regarded as eristic phenomenon). Moreover, rhetorical argumentation includes refutation techniques found in the collections of fallacies. The resources of rhetorical elocutio have potential for stirring up emotions which are most desirable in waging disputes. Or perhaps eristic is a degenerate component of both disciplines?

Formulating these questions shall serve our reflection on the essence of what we call eristic and eristicity. Given the current state of knowledge/current concepts of eristic, providing a list of consistent answers may prove to be particularly difficult. There is a need, however, for a clear distinction of the two ways in which eristic is defined today: classical (Aristotle) and new, modified, political and public. This does not mean that I accept the existence of two eristics.

I merely point out the fact that when critics interpret something as eristic they rely on one of the two types discussed below in detail. It needs to be emphasized that this division is neither historical, nor visible in all encounters and research communities. Certainly, a new perspective on the issue of eristic can be identified both in Polish and Russian research on argumentation in communication.

Classical eristic

The first definition that I quote comes from *A History of Ancient Philosophy* by Giovanni Reale. By presenting and interpreting the concepts of ancient philosophers, the author adapts their ideas to the field of contemporary discourse: "Eristic – a term derived from the word ἐρίζω, which means: I fight. It is the art of fighting with words in which you always defeat your opponent in the discussion (Reale 2008: 77). In this definition there are two important distinctions: First, concerning the interactive situation – "the art of fighting" – and second, concerning the goal – to "defeat your opponent." The essence of eristic lies in its usability and the arguments in dispute should be interpreted metaphorically as the blows inflicted on the opponent. Forcing our rival to surrender gives us the emotional and intellectual advantage which in the end should make him admit his defeat. This is the classical concept of eristic emerging from the interpretation proposed by Reale.

What should be emphasized is that eristic was not imbued with negative meaning from the outset. These were the Sophists who earned it bad reputation. The classic understanding of eristic places it in the domain of agonistic ethics. In the texts on rhetoric, eristic is defined as arguing in a debate with the intention of winning at all costs (Poulakos 2006). In the dialogue *Euthydemus* Plato features the Sophists who show off their eristic tricks. It is worth noting that Plato's examples depict a kind of argumentative practice which is more like a research dialogue (interview). Participants in the dialogue occupy unequal positions. In most interactions these are the Sophists who primarily ask questions using peirastic methods and force their adversary to surrender. However, both the participants and the audience are well aware that the so-called "victory" is realized in purely aesthetic and ritual dimension. The dialogue is more like a game of noughts and crosses, in which a more skillful player takes over a critical field and forces the opponent to admit defeat. The argumentative games of the Sophists have no deliberative dimension, and therefore do not apply to any

actual or alleged problems. They find their realization mainly in epideictic rhetoric where the primary objective of the Sophists is self-promotion.

Plato finds eristic harmful since it compels the interlocutor to accept the argument. Eristic is different from rhetoric because eristic does not convince us with the attractiveness of its argument, but instead it forces us to accept it, regardless of whether we consider it to be acceptable or not. For those who practice eristic it does not matter whether the argument is fallacious since their primary goal is to make sure that the opponent would not be able to refute it (Powell 1997: 585). Indeed this way of understanding eristic seems to be a distortion of dialectic. In *Meno* Plato distinguishes proper dialectic performed by friends and eristic practiced by opponents (*Meno* 75 c). Whereas dialectic is a joint investigation into the truth, eristic aims at the mutual destruction of positions in the dialogue.

Another argument discrediting eristic in the discussion suggests creating the impression of agreement or disagreement at the level of words, rather than at the level of substance which is being considered (Benson 2000: 87). In eristic it is appropriate for the questioner to apply every trick he can think of. Thus he can speak fast, hoping that his interlocutor will not have time to realize the fraud. He can force his opponent to give answers instantly without prior consideration. He can also resort to ridicule, pressure, or ambiguity.

In Plato's dialogues, both Socrates and the Sophists apply the method of refutation called *elenchos* which prompts the discussion partner to reject his previously established position. Socrates and the Sophists confound their interlocutors, but the confusion they create produces quite different effects. Whereas Socrates leads his interlocutors to a deeper awareness of the limits of their knowledge and consequently inspires them to expand intellectual horizons, the Sophists turn the interlocutors' confusion into helplessness associated with deficiencies in the art of argumentation (Benson 2000: 90).

Aristotle's approach to argumentation is more systematic. In the treatise *On Sophistical Refutations* he separates arguments corresponding to respective methods of reasoning: logic, dialectic, eristic and sophistry (Wolf 2009). Eristic is juxtaposed with sophistry and dialectic. Aristotle claims that eristic is a dishonest form of verbal fight in a discussion (*On Sophistical Refutations* 171b 23nn) and "[t]he contentious argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician" (*On Sophistical Refutations* 171b35).

Aristotle distinguishes fallacies which are either dependent or independent of the language:

FALLACIA IN DICTIONE	FALLACIA EXTRA DICTIONEM
ambiguity	dependent upon accident
amphiboly	dictio simpliciter
combination and division of words	ignoratio elenchi
accent	dependent upon the consequent
form of expression	petitio principii
	stating as cause what is not the cause
	the making of more than one question into one

The same fallacy can be either sophistical or eristic depending on the situational and teleological circumstances:

> Those, then, who do this in order to win the mere victory are generally considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons, while those who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are sophistical. For the art of sophistry is, as we said,' a kind of art of money-making from a merely apparent wisdom, and this is why they aim at a merely apparent demonstration: and quarrelsome persons and sophists both employ the same arguments, but not with the same motives: and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious, but not in the same respect; rather, it will be contentious in so far as its aim is an apparent victory, while in so far as its aim is an apparent wisdom, it will be sophistical: for the art of sophistry is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality (*On Sophistical Refutations* 171b).

Coli proposes a diagnosis on the popularity of this type of reasoning, claiming that in the 5th century BC the language of dialectic broke out of its isolation in order to reach a wide audience. Thus, dialectic replaced subtle Eleatic dialogues. Popularized by Gorgias – the master of dialectic and one of the founders of rhetoric – this approach transformed the dialectical language for use by the public (Colli 1991: 90-93). As Colli (1991: 91-92) further explains:

> In the case of dialectic the victory occurs when the debate is being properly developed by subsequent replies of the opponent, which in the end gets confirmed by the debate's outcome; in the case of rhetoric nothing in the performance of the orator can clearly predict its favorable course. In contrast to dialectical struggle, emotional factor (the impact on the audience) must be taken into account in order to win. Emotions subdue the audience to the speaker and secure his victory. Whereas dialectic competes for wisdom, rhetoric competes for wisdom oriented towards full control of the audience.

The philosophers from the Megarian school are regarded as heirs of eristic practices characterized by Plato in *Euthydemus*. Their method was vividly described by Teodor Gomperz:

If the great philosophies of Athens were compared to victorious army, the Megarians would be the riflemen, who never cease to provoke the rear guard and constantly disturb their march ahead. The search for inconsistencies in Athenian philosophical constructs and penetrating critique of dogmatic schools – from Aristotle to the Stoic and the Epicurean – that is what thinkers of Megara were always willing and ready to do (qtd in. Reale 2004, vol. 3: 83).

Eristic did not have a good reputation in ancient times. Thus the great rhetors who participated in political disputes must have seen the streak of destruction in the inner imperative of the speaker who pushed towards victory. Demosthenes claimed that the main threat to democracy, equality, freedom and security derives from agonistic desire of a powerful individual to demonstrate their superiority over others in every sphere of life – not only in private relationships, but in the public sphere as well (Yun Lee Too 2001: 200). This does not change the fact that the practice of agon in various spheres of life: in sport, politics, court, theater and state celebrations, was a popular form of participation in public life (Kocur 2001: 162). And where the competition took the form of a verbal dispute there was a temptation to delve into the reservoir of proven and dependable eristic methods.

Contemporary eristic

Eristic in the classical sense as illustrated by Plato in *Euthydemus* cannot under any circumstances be used or useful in today's public disputes. This does not result solely from eristic's ethical aspect, but mostly from the ineffectiveness of such practices in the sphere of policy, deliberation, and, on the whole, in relation to reality. The reality is to be the object of transformation and not of the verbal disputes.

The reemergence of eristic begins with Schopenhauer's intuition (it shall not be called a systematic study) expressed in a short treatise *The Art of Controversy*, which in Poland has gained much popularity (several editions since 1973). For Schopenhauer dialectic exhibits eristic dimensions. A mere intention to be right in a dispute calls for the eristic method. What he calls "eristic dialectic" is the art of discussion in which a semblance of reason is maintained, that is *per fas et nefas* (with honest and dishonest methods).

Schopenhauer adapts the Aristotelian division of proofs into *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* to the domain of eristic dialectic. Yet he places them in a situation of dispute and conflict between the parties competing for the approval of the

audience. As it is characteristic of the whole treatise, this division is also unsystematic, hence the suggestions for its adoption is purely interpretive. Schopenhauer (2009: 10) writes in the introduction:

> Our opponent has stated a thesis, or we ourselves,—it is all one. There are two modes of refuting it, and two courses that we may pursue. I. The modes are (1) *ad rem*, (2) *ad hominem* or *ex concessis*. That is to say: We may show either that the proposition is not in accordance with the nature of things, i.e., with absolute, objective truth; or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent, i.e., with truth as it appears to him.

Presenting one of the stratagems, he adds:

> This is chiefly practicable in a dispute between scholars in the presence of the unlearned. If you have no argument *ad rem*, and none either *ad hominem*, you can make one *ad auditores*; that is to say, you can start some invalid objection, which, however, only an expert sees to be invalid. Now your opponent is an expert, but those who form your audience are not, and accordingly in their eyes he is defeated (Schopenhauer 2009: 26).

Ad auditores seems to be a technical device. In a dispute it disregards both the complexity of the issue and the burden of proof referring solely to the judgment of the audience by giving them the appropriate simplified explication. Therefore the relationship between eristic and rhetoric can be presented as follows:

The modes of argumentation in rhetoric according to Aristotle	The modes of refuting the opponent's thesis according to Schopenhauer
Logos	*Ad rem*
Ethos	*Ad hominem*
Pathos	*Ad auditores*

The three pillars of eristic refutation contain the inventory of 38 stratagems, several of which are presented below:

The modes of refuting the opponent's thesis according to Schopenhauer	Eristic stratagems in The Art of Controversy (selection)
Ad rem	- **Generalization** - **Homonymy** - **Making the opponent's relative thesis sound absolute**
Ad hominem	- **Teasing the opponent** - **Urging the opponent to extend his statement further than he meant** - **Personal attack**

Ad auditores	- Labelling - To the audience - Terms of hate

Distortions in the sphere of argumentation include *logos* as well as *ethos* and *pathos*. The argument *ad rem*, according to Schopenhauer, would be characterized as the one referring to things, to the matter of dispute, rather than to a solid argument, as it is generally acknowledged in some of the later studies.[1] Argument distortion in interactions referred to as eristic occurs at all levels of argumentation and co-exists with the arguments based on the intersubjectively acceptable premise. It seems that Schopenhauer's intuition inclines towards understanding eristicity as a fraud in all modes of argumentation. For Aristotle, however, eristic resided in the sphere of *logos*.

Schopenahauer's theory evolves in the works by Kotarbiński, who has been a propagator of *Eristic Dialectic* (*Eristische Dialektik*) in Poland. In the *Preface* to the 1973 Polish edition Kotarbiński writes:

> If dispute is a kind of fight, then eristic – the art of disputation – is on the one hand a component of the broader argumentative craftsmanship, and, on the other hand, a particular instance of a fight . . . The topic of Schopenhauer's essay undoubtedly pertains to such a broad understanding of eristic, yet, it is merely its fragment.

What emerges from this fragment is an interesting dichotomy in evaluation. Eristic referred to as "the art of disputation" carries positive connotations. It is the skill worth acquiring and improving, which entails practicality to demonstrate proficiency in formulating positions in the dispute. Kotarbiński is far from condemning eristic, which is demonstrated in definitions and evaluations accompanying his interpretations. For him eristic is "the art of disputation in order to win the argument in front of those who determine the verdict, that is a judge or a jury" (Kotarbiński 1993: 415). What strikes us in this definition is the absence of remarks on eristic methods. Kotarbiński discusses them later when he divides them into "purely technical tricks" and "disloyal gimmicks." In the introduction he writes:

> We are not going to try here to teach you how to lead a dispute with one goal – victory – even at the expense of truth and fairness. However, we will indicate the most **eminent**

....
1. According to Szymanek (2001: 60) *ad rem* is an argument which premises are true objectively rather than true only in the opinion of the audience.

[emphasis added] eristic tricks since you should know how to avail yourself of these methods loyally in the right cause and how they can be used by a disloyal and cunning adversary (Kotarbiński 1993: 415).

Elsewhere Kotarbiński (2003: 272) defines eristic in the following way:

> Competence in the art of disputation, that is the exchange of arguments in order to win the recognition of the decisive body; the art of discussing and refuting the counterarguments as well as convincing others of the validity of our exposition.

Kotarbiński sees eristic as a special instance of the general theory of warfare applied to the area of verbal dispute. It is no exaggeration to say that the author is fascinated with the methods of designing the dispute as well as with devising argumentative tactics securing the favourable outcome.

The current difficulty with clarifying the meaning of eristic is associated with identification and selection of sources for methodological insights. A classical Aristotelian concept differs from that of Schopenhauer and his followers. Eristic persuasion may therefore mean "dishonest persuasion" or simply "persuasion implicated in dispute." The definitions presented below indicate the differences between these approaches:

Authors	Definitions of eristic
Aristotle	The contentious argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician (*On Sof. Ref.* **171 b35**)
	For just as a foul in a race is a definite type of fault, and is a kind of foul fighting, so the art of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation (*On Sof. Ref.* **171b 22**)
Schopenhauer	The science of man's innate desire to always be right. (*The Art of Controversy*)
	The art of disputing, and of disputing in such a way as to hold one's own, whether one is in the right or the wrong — *per fas et nefas* (*The Art of Controversy*)
Kotarbiński	Competence in the art of disputation, that is the exchange of arguments in order to win the recognition of the decisive body; the art of discussing and refuting the counterarguments as well as convincing others of the validity of our exposition (*Prakseologia*)

These three definitions show a significant shift in the areas in which eristic is conceptualized. These entail the consent for eristic with simultaneous broadening of its applicability. They range from a narrow concept – the set of tricks

(argumentative fouls, sophisms, fallacies, manipulative tactics), to a broader one – the art of disputation, that is an autonomous field of knowledge about standards of its use.

The absence of "new eristic" in Anglo-American research seems striking. The term "eristic" in the studies of communication exhibits its classical dimension. According to Walton (2004: 139), eristic dialogue consists in the exchange of verbal arguments, in which each side attacks the opponent in person. The best-known type of dialogue is an argument in which both sides act on emotion and blame each other by pointing out their adversaries' character flaws (Walton 2004: 139). Walton notes that the participants in eristic dialogue remain unresponsive to each other's arguments (see Lewiński 2012). It seems to me that this phenomenon is characteristic of an argument presented here as an example of eristic dialogue. However, the indifference to the arguments in a debate exhibits a totally different dimension. Indeed, the participants are not open to cooperation in the field of persuasion since they do not accept the opponent's line of argumentation. Yet they are willing to collaborate on the strategy of the dispute as they must both control it. Kotarbiński calls it negative cooperation which primary goal is to "make things difficult for your opponent" (Kotarbinski 1982: 221). Both sides are forcing each other to overcome obstacles using the techniques of dispute. The eristic and ritualistic approach to dispute thwarts reconciliation. It only becomes possible when the participants descend from the audience and free themselves from the control of the verdict-makers, such as voters or judges. Only then is positive cooperation achievable and consensus, such as mediation instead of court trial (debate), can be reached.

Wayne C. Booth (2004: 43) does not use the term "eristic" when he presents his division of the manifestations of rhetoric in various areas of communication. Referring to eristic, Booth introduces the new term: "Win-Rhetoric" (WR). This kind of rhetoric is applied by those who want to win at all cost. Booth formulates three interpretations of the "Win-Rhetoric" (WR):

1. WR a – the honest kind. The purpose of the speaker is to win because he knows that his case is right. His methods are sincere and honest. The reasons for the opponent's rhetorical activity are unfair.
2. WR b – the speaker's case is justified and he will fight for victory by any means, including unfair methods.
3. WR c – the speaker knows that his case is wrong, but he will fight to win the dispute.

Booth's passion for neologisms resulted in a choice of a new name for the Win-Rhetoric, which he described as "rhetrickery," that is "the whole range of shoddy dishonest communicative arts producing misunderstanding - along with other harmful results. The arts of making the worse seem the better course" (Booth 2004: 11). For Booth a particular danger resulting from the use of distorted rhetoric concerns the realm of politics and media.

The author's reflection goes towards maintaining the unity of rhetoric and merging different forms of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation as manifestations of rhetoricity.[2] Thus Booth invents the terms such as Win-Rhetoric, Listening-Rhetoric and Bargain-Rhetoric and, for those who use them, he defines what is ethical and unethical in every aspect of the situational and teleological sphere.

The trends observed in contemporary research in Russia confirm that the new eristic is not a local phenomenon reflecting specific fondness for Schopenhauer's treatise in Poland. Studies by Russian scholars develop Schopenhauer's intuitions and demonstrate the orientation towards eristic's autonomy as a field "serving" dispute:

> Eristic as the art of dispute presumes the victory regardless of the methods which are used. The speech is focused on obtaining the right to act and receive a conclusive judgment (Roždestvenskij 1997: 115).

> Eristic - the art of the disputation. Eristic as the analysis and formation of dispute is justified and useful (*Kratkiy slovar' po logike*, 1991).

> As a discipline, eristic can manifest itself in two forms: pure (theoretical) and applicable. Any study can be considered as applied eristic (as discussions on a specific topic, with a specific subject and based on specific rules). Such disputes provide extensive material for generalizations and allow for constructing individual subjects of eristic. Eristic can also be defined as a practical embodiment of many disciplines. Eristic is the result of using philosophy, logic, rhetoric, ethics, aesthetics, psychology, linguistics and other sciences (Blaževič, Selivanov 1999: .9).

....

2. A similar intuition was expressed by Bachtin (1986: 504): "The rhetorical dispute is an argument, which is not so much about getting closer to the truth, as about defeating the enemy. This is a lesser form of rhetoric."

Conclusion

In classical eristic the craftsmanship of interlocutors stems from a skill for formal transformations in the sphere of *logos* and from imitating non-fallacious reasoning. Yet this has earned eristic its bad reputation among systematic philosophers. Except for the personal benefit there is no positive value inherent in eristic endeavour. The lack of basic principles of Greek *paideia* had to raise strong opposition to the tricks used by the Sophists. The argument against eristic in its classical form is that eristic pretends to be dialectic, which stands for reasoning that aims to gain knowledge. The truth is that eristic imitates the movements of dialectic (visible in the interaction and the exchange of arguments), but performs transformations involving the figurative element of rhetoric in both the *verba* (*fallacia in dictione*) and *res* (*fallacia extra dictionem*).

New eristic expands the area of communicative behavior. It lays claim to dispute management (Blaževič, Selivanov), contemporary agonology (Kotarbiński) and the art of winning the dispute regardless of the type of evidence apparatus (Schopenhauer). Proclaiming its independent existence as a method or system of communication with a high acclaim among scholars (including Polish ones) would be an overstatement. This however does not change the fact that the post-Schopenhauerian concept of eristic differs from the classical approach. The dilemmas and questions related to the understanding and valuation of eristic in communication posed at the beginning of the article can only be solved by determining the choice of theory which formed the basis for a conceptualization of eristic in a given case.

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Erystyka i spór – aplikacje i interpretacje

Artykuł przedstawia problem erystyki i erystyczności i ich współczesnych konceptualizacji. Autorka zestawia koncepcję Arystotelesa, Schopenhauera, Kotarbińskiego, pokazując różnice w podejściu do problemu erystyki. Proponuje, aby dokonać rozróżnienia na erystykę w sensie klasycznym i erystykę w sensie nowym. Nowe ujęcie odpowiadałoby temu obszarowi retoryki, który wydzielił Wayne Booth pod nazwą Win-Rhetoric. Autorka zaznacza, że inne od Arystotelesowego spojrzenie na erystykę prezentują też niektórzy autorzy rosyjscy (Rożdestvenskij, Blaževič, Selivanov). Dopiero deklaracja interpretatora dotycząca przyjęcia określonej

koncepcji erystyki, umożliwi odczytanie jej przejawów (strategii argumentacyjnych i problemów z obszaru etyki) w interakcjach komunikacyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: erystyka, Arystoteles, Kotarbiński, Schopenhauer, retoryka zwycięstwa

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THE DISPUTE AS A POLITICAL SPECTACLE: A RHETORICAL *ACTIO* DURING THE COLD WAR

Politics represented by the U.S. presidency - a very exposed function of public life - has become one of the areas in which the classical rhetorical deliberation has been dominated by the formula of a spectacle. The dispute in politics transforms into a spectacle when the events presented in the media take the form of a drama, and the real action gives way to their mediated representation emphasizing the image over the content. In this paper the 1983 invasion of Grenada authorized by Ronald Reagan serves as an example of a rhetorical *actio*. The purpose of this article is to prove that the decision of the United States to invade Grenada was not due to a direct threat to the political and economic interests of America, but it stemmed from the potential to create a media spectacle. The analysis based on Kenneth Burke's dramatism stresses the symbolic value of the political events and gestures which are inextricably connected with the construction of antagonism between the symbolic opponents in a featured actio: American democracy and Cuban communism.

Key words: spectacle, rhetoric, dramatism, Kenneth Burke, Ronald Reagan

In today's media culture the president of the United States occupies a particularly exposed position. His political functions are often overshadowed by public functions and consequently president's rhetorical and theatrical abilities become an extremely valuable asset in dealing with the public. Therefore, the relationship between rhetoric and drama has important implications for the understanding of the strategies used by the president to advance his agenda. Recognizing the rhetorical and theatrical sensibility as means of performative communication, Peter Zhang, a professor of communication, and Yi Zhao, a professor of political science, in a jointly written essay entitled "The Rhetorical-Theatrical Sensibility as Equipment for Living" show how the drama and rhetoric shape the image of today's democracy, and the image of the president in particular (2012: 192). Their joint effort is a vital example of the interdisciplinary nature of research on the rhetorical dimension of social interaction, represented by politics. Furthermore,

the authors invoke the theoretical perspective of Kenneth Burke's dramatism by presenting philosophical and anthropological theories, which offer insight into presidential communicative strategy of *going public* promoted by Samuel Kernell (2006).

Zhang and Zhao (2012: 186) point out the fact that "[e]very theatrical performance has its rhetorical thrust" and "[e]very rhetorical performance is an act in the drama of human relations, and, as such, is subject to comprehension in dramatistic terms." Given the importance these authors attach to the dramatic framework of human life, one may infer that from the point of view of the recipient, the drama provides an opportunity to "act out" emotions and look at various problems and issues in an indirect way. On this assumption, the authors compare the function of the dramatization of reality to the myth of Medusa whose gaze would turn everything into a stone. To kill her, Perseus looked at her reflection in his shield, which allowed him to avoid the lethal force of the female monster's gaze. As the authors explain (2012: 187): "Theatrical drama as an art form is like a shield in the Medusa myth, which allows us to face our psychological problems ('Medusa') indirectly, so we can deal with them without being crushed by them (without being petrified)." This is the premise this study is designed to investigate. The primary hypothesis states that the modern president assumes the role of Perseus, whose dramatic narrative of events shapes in his audience a specific type of sensitivity towards the surrounding "medusas," or problems. Combined with Guy Debord's (1967/1994) observation that contemporary politics bears resemblance to theatrical spectacle, the case study of the U.S. invasion of Grenada serves as an illustration of the dramatic framework in presidential politics.

1. Kenneth Burke's dramatism as a method for analyzing presidential persuasion

Comparing ancient and modern tradition of juxtaposing rhetoric and drama, it is worth noting that although Aristotle divided the study of rhetoric and theater into two treaties (*Rhetoric* and *Poetics*), Kenneth Burke combined them in his theory of dramatism. In this way Burke wanted to provide explanation for the fact that human activity is never entirely persuasive (rhetoric) or symbolic (art for the art's sake). For further clarification, Zhang and Zhao (2012: 192) cite a fragment from Burke's work entitled *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, in which he explains that in the rhetorical/dramatic

co-existence rhetoric assumes the role of propaganda, calling for concrete action, while the artistic side of the drama is bound to move the emotions, prompting the audience towards contemplation and acquiescence.

At this point it seems appropriate to return to the basics of the theory of dramatism in order to show the potential of this method of rhetorical criticism when it is applied in a broad context of social sciences, including political science dealing with rhetorical presidency. Wishing to give dramatism due importance, Burke (1964: 20) promoted the idea that in comparison with a purely scientific analysis, the dramatistic perspective broadens the horizon of interpretation by bringing into play a human perspective, whereas science itself is limiting and dehumanizes all critical theories. He set out from the assumption that human action is performed according to the rules of drama. In the definition of dramatism, which Burke published in 1968 in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, the author writes: "drama is employed, not as a metaphor but as a fixed form that helps us discover what the implications of the terms 'act' and 'person' *really are*." In other words, drama for Burke functions as a natural choice for the analysis of social relations. It exposes the conflicts that take place between people afflicted with innate imperfection.

Aristotle described the affective nature of drama, which manifests itself in spectators' identification with the fate of the featured characters. Following the course of events, the audience becomes emotionally involved in what is happening on stage. Also, their emotions change with the development of the plot. When a character comes to a tragic end, the spectator's suppressed emotional energy gets released, and the greater the identification with the character, the greater the sense of cleansing and catharsis. Burke (1973: 263) observed a similar mechanism in rhetoric, which is a useful tool for playing out the drama of social coexistence and division. People, and politicians in particular, use rhetoric to perform the ritual of identification and exclusion, called "Othering". According to Burke (1961b: 236), exclusion is a ritual, in which stigmatizing the opponent (the process called "victimage") becomes a source of catharsis, and, at the same time, strengthens the sense of identification with the non-stigmatized majority. In the context of politics, the reality assumes the characteristics of the drama in which the role of the president is to persuade the audience to share in his vision of the social hierarchy by believing in his authenticity and effectiveness. International conflicts with their political contextualization and binary rhetorical categories of "us" (the good ones) vs. "them" (the evil ones) are a type of exigence

which allows the president to craft the new narrative of a crisis threatening the integrity of the nation. His skill in creating suggestive dramatic frame for the rhetorical situation of a conflict allows him to emerge as a powerful leader committed to the security and well-being of American people. The analytical framework in this paper is Bruce Miroff's essay *The Presidential Spectacle* (2009) in which the author analyzes the spectacular dimension of American invasion of Grenada from the perspective of a political scientist. The article extends Miroff's work to include a rhetorical level of interpretation featuring the elements of Burke's theory of dramatism. The mediatization and performative character of this foreign policy "drama," which allowed Reagan to turn the relatively small intervention into a grand media spectacle, aptly represents the shift from the traditional model of presidential deliberative persuasion "for the elites" promoted by Richard Neustadt (1960) with the model of performative persuasion "for the masses" proposed by Kernell. In other words, the carefully directed spectacle of the intervention in Grenada helped Reagan to fulfil the primary rhetorical function of dramatization of political conflict by enhancing communal identification and inducing conformity to presidential decisions. Thanks to dramatism, a theoretical and constitutional dimension of presidential power associated with political science may be supplemented with the rhetorical and cultural aspects of presidential agency vital for communication studies.

2. Performative dimension of presidential *actio*

In the socio-political context, the structure of drama illustrates the mechanism of a man's relationship to other people and to institutions. Apart from Burke, this theme has been developed by other critics of rhetoric and literature, as well as researchers from the fields of anthropology and philosophy. Among these, the prominence should be given to the works of Victor Turner (1974) who writes about the "social drama"; Walter Ong (1982) and Lewis Mumford (1962) who analyze the individual in terms of their performative dimension; and Paul Virilio (2008) who depicts the modern demos as the chorus in an ancient drama. Presentation of the main concepts of these theories may allow for more precise positioning of the theory of *going public* in the context of drama, with particular emphasis on the performative and spectacular nature of the president's public appearances.

A British anthropologist, Victor Turner, in his book *Dramas, Fields, and*

Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society introduced the concept of a "social drama" based on the observation of mechanisms of social conflicts. The author (1974: 37) distinguished four phases in a social drama: breach, crisis, redressive action, reintegration or schism. According to Turner, drama depicts the creation of disharmony in the rhythm of social processes, resulting in the eruption of a specific kind of emotions. As a result, the division is formed, and, similarly to drama, the participants of the conflict take sides, forming factions and weakening the unity of the whole. Turner, like Burke, treats rhetoric as a symbolic and material medium through which social dramas are "acted out."

In the context of the speaker-audience relations, the performative nature of the rhetorical act was noted by Mark Backman. In his book on the sophists, he wrote (1991: 79): "the orator did not simply speak to an assembly of citizens according to the rules of art. He enacted before them the drama of their lives as it was constituted in the challenges they confronted as a community." This interpretation places the social reality in the context of theatrical ritual based on the interaction between the actor (speaker, politician) and the spectator (listener, citizen). The difference seems to lie solely in the stakes involved in both kinds of experience, which in the "staged" social reality is unfortunately real.

The fact that life and drama as its staging and interpretive frame have a lot in common was also discussed by Walter Ong, an American literary scholar. The author of the renown *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World* perceived an individual as an actor, and the reality as the "improvisational public drama" (Lanham 1986: 135). Contrary to logic, rhetoric is characterized by its unpredictability, resulting from the fact that a rhetorical act is constantly being "created." The reality and identity built on this act are realized in a performative way, which means: continuously and variably. As concluded by Lewis Mumford (1962: 25), an American philosopher known for his work on the impact of technology on modern civilization: "By becoming human, man exchanges the stable natural self, native to each biological species, for a countless multitude of possible selves, molded for the working out of a special drama and plot he himself helps to create." Ong's and Mumford's theories concerning the individualization of human existence in the contemporary world correspond with the views of Samuel Kernell. In today's media reality, the president as an actor on the political scene, acts out his own show, and the "possible selves" stand for poses which the president assumes. These depend on the preferences of the audience, which are measured and estimated on the basis of the opinion poll results.

The last of these authors, a French culture theorist Paul Virilio, directed the discussion of the rhetoric and drama relationship towards the issue of audience functioning in a democratic system. In his opinion, chorus commenting on the events in an ancient drama serves as the prototype of demos. Virilio defines demos as the community of free citizens, who are the source of rights and power in a democratic system. Virilio's statement (2008: 214) that "[t]he ancient Chorus is the beginning of democracy" emphasizes the importance of rhetorical deliberation for the proper development of the state. Just as chorus comments on the drama to make its message universal, a good speaker should also represent the views and the mood of his audience. Showing the relationship between the dramatic action and the situation of the audience, chorus assumes the function of an ideal spectator and a representative of a polis. As Zhang and Zhao (2012: 193) conclude: "Indeed, theater makes a good model for the democratic way of life, which unfolds on a stage called the public sphere, where the social forces both co-operate and contest with each other." In other words, chorus in the drama is the voice of the public, commenting on the surrounding reality. Like chorus in an ancient tragedy, demos in democracy serves as the valid source of opinion, and, as such, it replaces the elites as the leading partner in the dialogue with the head of state.

The role of the public as a recipient of presidential rhetoric constitutes an important factor when the theory of *going public* is read in the context of Burke's dramatism. Kernell's theory focuses mainly on the form of communication, which sets it apart from Neustadt's model, centered on the person of the speaker. Paraphrasing Burke's thought contained in *Psychology and Form*, Zhang and Zhao (2012: 191) present the role of a medium as follows:

> Like rhetoric, theatrical drama compels the audience's attention not by information but by form. (...) To be efficacious, to move and transport the audience, theater and rhetoric both rely on eloquence, on good form – namely, the arousing, temporary frustration, and ultimate fulfilling of expectations in the audience. Like political actors in real life who are held accountable for the decorum of their speech and action, the protagonist on stage is there first and foremost to model a sense of human propriety, poise, and taste proper to his character and the multidimensional situation.

The passage proves that both Burke and Kernell base their theories on the assumption that in the formulation of the message both in the drama and in a rhetorical act, the central role is played by a wide audience for whom the main criterion of evaluating the performance of both "political actors" and "protagonists

on stage" is the level of fulfilled expectations. Zhang and Zhao define this approach as "ground orientation," and contrast it with Neustadt's "figure orientation," exposing the speaker. Burke (1964: 27) asserts that drama above all "must never lose sight of its audience."

The consequences of such an orientation manifest themselves in both formal and psychological terms. In drama, as well as in rhetoric, the canons of *dispositio* (composition) and *elocutio* (style) should be consistent with the psychological structure of the auditorium. This is an enormous challenge for the framers of both forms, who should be able to read human moods. Burke (1961a: 93) cites William Shakespeare as an example: "If a writer's audience believes that it is wrong to murder a friend, the poet can 'cash in on' this belief, as Shakespeare did with great subtlety in depicting the relations between Brutus and Caesar." The awareness of the characteristics and expectations of contemporary audiences is the key to effective leadership in every area of public life. Zhang and Zhao (2012: 188) aptly captured the character of the relationship between rhetoric and drama in the following passage:

> [A] rhetorical discourse is a theater (...) where human relations are mapped out symbolically, in the same way they are mapped out on the theatrical stage through embodied characters. A character in a theatrical drama is oftentimes the image of a unique social dialect or sociolinguistic consciousness in the same way terms in a rhetorical text are the equivalents of social, cultural forces. In a way, theater is rhetoric fully "animated," and rhetorical texts are drama played out by verbal means. Both thrive on, enact, negotiate, and symbolically manage tensions in human affairs. We simply need to be aware of the convertibility and be sensitive to the conditions of conversion.

Moving beyond the framework of scientific theory in the field of political science, rhetorical analysis of presidential activities in the dramatic frame allows us to expand the perspective of research to include socio-cultural aspects.

The fusion of rhetoric and politics through dramatism puts in the foreground the dynamics of the relationship between the elements of a dramatistic pentad: the *agents* – the president with the public, and the *agency* – the media. This convention very accurately captures the specificity of contemporary changes in the form of presidential persuasion, which, due to the development of the media, transformed from the rhetoric of negotiations, described by Neustadt, into the rhetoric of a spectacle, analyzed by Debord. What drama and spectacle share is the concept of a symbol. For Burke a symbol is an indicator of human features, and the spectacle may be interpreted in terms of a symbolic event since its

elements reveal a deeper conceptual content. Both drama and spectacle feature characters/actors who are represented in a dynamic (vs. static) manner. Their actions give rise to their public identity. According to this theory, apart from his political functions, the president assumes the role of an actor in a one-man spectacle, who stages his performance on a changing social and cultural scene.

3. The U.S. invasion of Grenada: a contemporary illustration of a presidential spectacle

The 1983 invasion of Grenada at the initiative of Ronald Reagan may serve as a good example of the president's media spectacle seen through the lens of rhetorical *actio*. The authors of *Media Power Politics* (1982: 21) point out the fact that contemporary media simplify and reduce the event to conventional symbols in order to be more easily accessible for the audience. In the case of the American president this argument means that for the sake of popularity it is more preferable for the head of state to stage an effective political spectacle as described by Guy Debord in lieu of engaging in complicated policy debates preferred by Neustadt. During the intervention, which created a lot of controversy in the nation, Reagan, in the words of Debord, assumed the role of a "spectacular representation of living human beings" and a "pseudo-star" (1994: par.60). But the President himself was not opposed to such an image since in the American political system centered on the figure of the president, the head of state faces enormous expectations on the part of his constituents. Stephen Wayne (1982) and Thomas Cronin (1980) identify them as excessive and contradictory, since the results will never be satisfactory for those for whom the president is the reflection of their personal hopes and dreams.

Therefore, it may be understandable why Reagan, as well as most other post-World War II presidents, made use of a media spectacle as a tool for projecting the most universal image, assuming that symbols and gestures speak louder than words. What remains debatable, however, is the issue whether the actor's pose exemplified by Reagan's "dramatic" postures on the photographs from the golf course resort where he learnt about the situation in Grenada, generally brings the president closer, or sets him apart, from the average citizen. Debord (1994: par. 61) has no doubt that the performance meets the second scenario, because – paradoxically – "[t]he admirable people who personify the system are indeed well known for not being what they seem to be; they have achieved greatness

by embracing a level of reality lower than that of the most insignificant individual life." To understand the logic of turning the international conflict into president's media spectacle, two elements need to be taken into consideration: the president as the leading actor, and symbolic gestures as carriers of meaning revealed in the *actio* of the head of state.

A good model of applying the framework of drama to the interpretation of historical events was developed by Bruce Miroff in his essay *The Presidential Spectacle* (2009). Despite the absence of references to Burke, the analysis of a political scientist follows the rules of a dramatistic method characteristic for a rhetorical analysis. Firstly, it highlights the importance of symbolism and gestures in presidential actions, and, secondly, it applies the dramatic way of constructing antagonisms between the symbolic characters: American democracy and Cuban communism. In the history of the American presidency Ronald Reagan personifies the idea of politics as spectacle. To paraphrase the opinion of Michael Rogin (1987), Reagan as a professional actor, easily navigated through the formula of spectacle, having no problem with featuring various characters. Associated with strength and determination, which counterbalanced the weaknesses of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, Reagan became the embodiment of American values. However, in a large part, Reagan's spectacle was directed by the PR specialists from the White House. Bruce Miroff (2009: 262) relates the details of this strategy, formally crafted for the successful 1984 re-election campaign, in the following fragment:

> The spectacle specialists who worked for Reagan seized on the idea of making him an emblem for the American identity. In a June 1984 memo, White House aide Richard Darman sketched a reelection strategy that revolved around the president's mythic role: "Paint RR as the personification of all that is right with or heroized by America. Leave Mondale in a position where an attack on Reagan is tantamount to an attack on America's idealized image of itself." Having come into office at a time of considerable anxiety, with many Americans uncertain about the economy, their future and the country itself, Reagan was an immensely reassuring character. (...) He told Americans that the Vietnam War was noble rather than appalling, that Watergate was forgotten, that racial conflict was a thing of a distant past, and that the U.S. economy still offered the American dream to any aspiring individual. Reagan (the character) and America (the country) were presented in the spectacles of the Reagan presidency as timeless, above the decay of aging and the difficulties of history.

Featured as a symbolic figure, Reagan could turn specific events into a symbolic spectacle as well. The invasion of the Caribbean Grenada may serve as a good example. The immediate cause of the first U.S. intervention since Vietnam was

a military coup d'état in October 1983 which put in danger 200 American medical students stationed on the island. Indirectly, the invasion was aimed primarily at discrediting leftist government of Bernard Coard, who aimed at transforming the country into a communist state and for this he sought the support of the Cuban regime.

The scale of the American intervention in relation to the potential and importance of Grenada seems particularly dubious. It was a small island with a population of 100,000 residents, whose exports in 1981 amounted to only $ 19 million. To the estate of this size Reagan sent more than 7,000 soldiers, who had to deal with the army which was ten times smaller and less armed. It was clear from the outset that the intervention would be a success. What, then, prompted Reagan to such a spectacular move? Miroff (2009: 265) puts forward a claim that "Grenada's importance did not derive from the military, political, and economic implications of America's actions, but from its value as a spectacle." Hereinafter, the author presents its most important elements.

The first of the elements of spectacle was the scenery. Reagan received the news about the situation in Grenada playing golf in Augusta, Georgia. The golf course played a role of a meaningful background in a dramatic *actio*, which was described vividly, but with humor, by the *New York Times* reporter:

> The White House offered the public some graphic tableaux, snapped by the White House photographer over the weekend, depicting the President at the center of various conferences. He is seen in bathrobe and slippers being briefed by Mr. Shultz and Mr. McFarlane, then out on the Augusta fairway, pausing at the wheel of his golf cart as he receives another dispatch. Mr Shultz is getting the latest word in another, holding the special security phone with a golf glove on (Miroff 2009: 265).

Interestingly, the visual spectacle consisted solely of images of the president and his entourage. This was due to the fact that American correspondents did not get permission to report from Grenada. Miroff admits that Reagan's decision in this respect was fully conscious and strategic. The media coverage of the invasion limited to the perspective of the president gave him an opportunity to pose for a strong and decisive leader. It also prevented the association of Reagan's policy with the images of war, which is usually steeped in violence and blood of innocent victims. Moreover, the one-sided story hindered criticism from Congress. Blocking the access to the evidence prevented the politicians in Washington from holding the president accountable for his actions.

In addition to images, Miroff draws attention to Reagan's rhetoric, quoting

fragments of the speech announcing the invasion. the author highlights the president's rationale for creating the image of the communist regime as evil. Facing an imminent threat to American security, Reagan claims he had no other choice but to "act strongly and decisively (Miroff 2009: 266). The practice of citing excerpts from presidential addresses is rarely used in the political science literature, as this aspect of the president's activity falls into the domain of speech communication. Nevertheless, Miroff refers to Reagan's words in order to examine his rhetorical strategy of building tension between the two hostile systems involved in the conflict. The author emphasizes the principle of contrast reflected in the juxtaposition of "a brutal group of leftist thugs" against the noble America, acting in the name of democracy (Miroff 2009: 266). Miroff, however, disregards the fact that this is a rhetorical figure of speech, called antithesis.

At one point the spectacle in Grenada took the form of emotional improvisation. After leaving the plane, several students kneeled down and kissed the American soil. The pictures of this gesture were immediately broadcast in the media, and, as expected, the emotionally-laden image triggered a surge of spontaneous patriotic feelings. This time, the antithesis appeared in the sphere of imagery and character formation: what "weak" Carter was unable to do for the hostages in Iran turned into a success attributed to "effective" Reagan.

The last part of the spectacular *actio* was meant to create a narrative expanding the symbolism of the event beyond the rhetorical context of the particular situation. A divisional use of rhetoric served the purpose of transferring the political conflict to the metaphorical realm of the timeless struggle between good and evil. To do so, the administration used the alleged evidence of documents and weapons found in Grenada which were to confirm Cuban plans to use the island as a base to spread the communist revolution. Reagan personally addressed these allegations in a prophetic statement: "Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time" (Miroff 2009: 266). In this way, what finally emerged from the spectacle in Grenada was the mystical and spiritual mission, in which the forces of good with intense urgency set out to combat the forces of evil. Each element was subordinated to the angel-devil enthymeme, which proved a very successful strategy. The divisional rhetoric guaranteed the president a huge surge in popular approval - up to 63 percent - the highest rate since Reagan started his term.

After the invasion the spectacle went on uninterrupted: the president welcomed the rescued students to the White House, and the Pentagon issued 8 thousand medals, which is more than the number of troops sent to Grenada. The president was aware that rather than history, he created the spectacle. This sentiment was captured by Anthony Lewis immediately after the intervention. He wrote in the *New York Times*: "[Reagan] knew the facts would come out eventually. (...) But if that day could be postponed, it might make a great political difference. People would be left with their first impression that this was a decisive President fighting communism" (Miroff 2009: 267). In this way an act of minor political importance turned into a spectacle of great significance for the president's image and reputation.

4. Rhetorical and theatrical dimension of the presidency: a conclusion

The interpretation of the theory of political leadership from rhetorical perspective proposes a more interdisciplinary way of analyzing the American presidency. Burke's dramatism and Debord's metaphor of spectacle, associated primarily with communication studies, open the presidency to the cultural context, which goes beyond the theoretical models of leadership in political science. The interpretation of the conflict in Grenada which has combined these two competing disciplines of presidential research was aimed to show the rhetorical dimension of the presidency and to prove that it is not different, but complementary, to the theoretical and political context.

The focus of dramatism is to analyze the way in which reality is "acted out." In the light of McLuhan's famous statement that "medium is the message," in this article the emphasis has been put on the president's (*agent's*) performance during the conflict situation when a political dispute is "staged" as a media spectacle. The application of a dramatistic method of rhetorical criticism to the interpretation of a political science theory of *going public* may contribute to a deeper understanding of the way in which the modern rhetorical leadership of the U.S. president is inscribed in the contemporary media spectacle, as described by Guy Debord.

In conclusion, Burke's dramatism allows us to characterize the president not only as a purely political figure, but also as an individual actor shaping his performance and influencing interaction with his audience. Dramatistic method of rhetorical criticism offers a flexible frame to evaluate the broader symbolic

trajectories of presidential political performance and therefore has the potential to provide new insights on important questions about mediatization of politics and its impact on the leaders as agents in political *actio*. In consequence, rhetorical/theatrical perspective reveals a more complex character of the American presidency in the era of rapidly advancing technological and socio-cultural changes.

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Spór jako polityczny spektakl: retoryczne actio w czasach zimnej wojny

Polityka – a w szczególności prezydentura amerykańska – jako wyjątkowo eksponowana dziedzina życia publicznego stała się jednym z obszarów, w którym formuła spektaklu zdominowała klasyczną formułę retorycznej deliberacji. W politycznym sporze formuła spektaklu przejawia się w tym, iż wydarzenia przedstawiane w mediach przyjmują formę udramatyzowaną, a rzeczywiste działanie ustępuje miejsca medialnej reprezentacji w formie obrazu. W książce pt. *Media spectacle* Douglas Kellner zauważa, iż korporacyjny charakter relacji nowych mediów i globalnej ekonomii skutkuje rozwojem nowych form *technokapitalizmu* i *technokultury*, w których spektakl przyjmuje postać *info-rozrywki* (ang. *infotainment*). W artykule za przykład retorycznego *actio* w konwencji spektaklu posłuży inwazja na Grenadę (1983) dokonana z inicjatywy Ronalda Reagana. Celem artykułu jest udowodnienie tezy, iż decyzja o interwencji Stanów Zjednoczonych na Grenadzie nie wynikała z bezpośredniej konieczności obrony interesów polityczno-ekonomicznych, lecz z potencjału do stworzenia medialnego spektaklu. W analizie według reguł teorii dramatyzmu Kennetha Burke'a podkreślono znaczenie symboliki wydarzeń i gestów prezydenta oraz sposób konstruowania antagonizmów pomiędzy symbolicznymi bohaterami akcji: amerykańską demokracją i kubańskim komunizmem.

Słowa kluczowe: spektakl, retoryka, dramatyzm, Kenneth Burke, Ronald Reagan

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RONALD REAGAN: LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY

This paper examines President Ronald Reagan's discourse, focusing on the most complete statements of his Cold War rhetoric. It identifies the techniques used by the president to launch an ideological offensive against the Soviets and drawing on the Soviet leaders' responses to his anti-Communist crusade it tries to gauge whether he managed to create a solid front among the Soviet leadership. The objective is to reveal Reagan's intention to expose his personal role in this effort.

Key words: Ronald Reagan, Language, Communism, Cold War

1. Rhetorical Studies and the Cold War

In *Rhetorical Criticism. Exploration and Practice*, Sonja K. Foss (1989: 291) writes that when rhetorical critics show interest in the Cold War for what it suggests about the concepts the war was based on, the beliefs and values it promoted, or the interpretations of the world order by which individuals and groups operated, their focus is on the ideology expressed in the discourse of the war. One of the major differences between the Cold War and other historical struggles is that the Cold War was not only about conflicting political or economic interests, but it was also, or, as some critics suggest, primarily, about opposing ideologies. Major presidential foreign policy pronouncements, including the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Kennedy Doctrine, the Johnson Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Carter Doctrine, exemplified, enacted and expressed ideological underpinnings of the war. Studying the ideology of the Cold War rhetorically, be it in addresses to Congress, addresses to the nation, speeches, transcripts of debates, conversations, or news conferences, means analyzing the war fought with words.

A review of literature bearing upon rhetorical scholarship has revealed that three books have made a substantial contribution to the study of the Cold War

texts. The first book, entitled *The Origins of the Cold War* by Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, offers an overview of three dominant philosophical schools of interpretation of the Cold War origins: the first being the official school, which assigns the blame for the Cold War exclusively to the Soviet Union, the second being the revisionist school, which holds that the United States was solely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, and the third being the realist school, which blends former hypotheses and interprets the developments that gave rise to the Cold War as a series of events that created the history of post-World War II international relations. The second book, Wayne Brockriede and Robert L. Scott's *Moments in the Rhetoric of the Cold War*, examines three moments of the Cold War from a rhetorical perspective using various procedures and focusing on various dimensions of the selected rhetorical transactions, including the dimensions of personal persuasiveness, interpersonal distance, and context in which people and ideas interrelate. The third book, entitled *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* by Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, advances the assumption included in Brockriede and Scott's work that rhetoric is the center of debate and analysis and examines the Cold War discourse from the strategic, metaphorical, and ideological perspectives.

Medhurst (1997: xiii-xiv) observes in the "Introduction" to *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* that while many rhetorical scholars study the Cold War discourse ideologically, they adopt approaches which are similar to or follow the methodologies of the three dominant critics. Scholars interested in the relationship between a text and its context follow Wander, who emphasizes the importance of analyzing a text in its context in order to gain a fuller understanding of the rhetorical situation being analyzed and of the ideological factors which shaped the speaker's worldview. Critics examining the material consequences of public policy follow Dana Cloud, who stresses the significance of Marxist materialism in the study of public policy. Researchers tracing the link between symbolism and ideology follow Michael Calvin McGee, who uses the concept of the ideograph to show that concrete instances of words or phrases invoked in political discourse reveal the speaker's ideological convictions.

Drawing on McGee's assumption (1990: 334) made in an article "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology" that ideology is a political language, manifested in political documents, with the capacity to shape and control people's beliefs and behaviors, this paper examines Reagan's discourse, focusing

on the most complete statements of his Cold War rhetoric. These include: his first news conference held on January 29, 1981; the address to the members of the British Parliament from June 8, 1982; the address at the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals from March 8, 1983; and the address to the nation on defense and national security from March 23, 1983. The goal of the paper is to identify the rhetorical techniques used by the president to launch an ideological offensive against the Soviets. Further, using the Soviet leaders' responses to Reagan's anti-Communist crusade as a yardstick of rhetorical success, this paper tries to gauge whether the president managed to create a solid front among the Soviet leadership, thus influencing, if not determining, the shape of American-Soviet relations during his first term as president. The objective of this paper is to reveal Reagan's intention to expose his personal role in this effort.

2. Setting

To gain a fuller understanding of Reagan's rhetorical choices, the specific circumstances in which his statements were written and then delivered should be briefly outlined. In "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," Wander (Medhurst, et al. 1997: 154) advocates expanding the analysis beyond the text and examining the historical setting in which the text was drafted and then presented. He argues that critics analyzing rhetorical situations must take into account the way rhetoric relates to facts and events beyond the language employed, matters on which people's lives depend, to gain an insight into the rhetorical situation being critiqued. In his view, relating text to its context provides a more thorough ideological understanding of the speaking situation and of the influences that shaped the speaker's world perspective. What follows is a brief analysis of the historical, political, ideological, and psychological factors that affected Reagan's message.

To begin with, it should be kept in mind that by 1983, as James M. McCormick (1992: 170-186) explains in *American Foreign Policy and Process*, the foreign policy of the Reagan administration strongly resembled the Cold War consensus of three decades earlier. The United States reverted to a view of the world as dichotomous, that is, as divided into those countries which stood for capitalism and democracy (with the United States being their leader) and those representing socialism and totalitarianism under the Soviet leadership. The Reagan foreign policy restored confidence that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for both

international interventionism and global terrorism and revived the national will to contain and confront the Soviet Union to ensure that it would not expand its influence or increase its control of its satellites. The Cold War consensus was further reflected in the U.S. determination to resume the role of the leader of the free world to carry out its mission of reshaping the global order through restoring its economic and military strength, reinvigorating military and economic alliances and enlarging the global consensus against the Soviet expansionism. An important aspect of the Reagan foreign policy was also restoration of the assumption that only the American know-how was the best solution to the economic and social problems of the underdeveloped nations and that the American approach to politics ensured progress and defended democracy worldwide.

The underlying reason for the renewal of the Cold War consensus was a reassessment by the Reagan administration of four major concepts underlying U.S. foreign policy – peace, power, principles, and prosperity. The president believed that peace was achievable only through strength. Confrontation was the most effective means of controlling Soviet behavior. Moreover, American power had to be reasserted through containment and rollback of Communists. Soviet influence could be limited only through a renewed arms race. Nuclear superiority was a prerequisite to a more effective arms control. Further, the Cold War of the 1980s was an ideological warfare aimed at exploiting the strengths of capitalism and exposing the weaknesses of Communism. Finally, prosperity had to be assured through low inflation and high growth rates. The goal was to strengthen America's ability to confront Soviet power. With the four revised concepts as the primary guide to U.S. foreign policy, a short overview of American actions toward the Soviet Union will illustrate how the Reagan administration put these dimensions into action.

First, Reagan took direct actions. He embarked on a strategic force modernization plan which provided for deploying new intercontinental missiles in existing silos and intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, developing the B-1 bomber and the Trident II submarine-launched missile, and introducing a new space-based, computer-controlled defensive system called the Strategic Defense Initiative. Next, his administration provided nations such as Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia with military aid and political assistance and helped them to defy Communist and totalitarian regimes. Reagan believed that containing and ousting Communists in power was crucial to the credibility of the United States and its alliances. Moreover, appeals were made for Europeans

and the Japanese to adopt an anti-Soviet military and political course, taking greater military responsibility for counteracting Soviet expansionist actions in Europe and Asia and supporting American economic sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union and Poland for introducing martial law in the Soviet satellite. Furthermore, the president drew on a demonic and despotic view of the enemy to convince the American public that Communist and totalitarian regimes were far more repressive than any other governments, however flawed those other governments could be. Finally, the Reagan administration refused to engage in arms control discussions and summit meetings thus conveying to the Soviets that normal and reciprocal relations between the two powers could be restored only when the Soviets showed restraint in their global actions.

Second, as McCormick observes, rhetorical attacks were made against the Soviet Union. President Reagan used aggressive anti-Soviet rhetoric, moving away from the language of détente used by his predecessors who stressed coexistence and cooperation with the Soviets towards the language of confrontation which emphasized distrust of Soviet politics and the Marxist ideology. The president's policy advisors followed his hard-line approach. Secretary of State Alexander Haig stressed the necessity to restore the Soviet Union to the center of American foreign affairs and prioritize Soviet expansionist, adventurist and opportunistic behavior. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger cautioned against the effects of the policy of appeasement towards Moscow when he said that the United States had to recognize the Soviet threat and counter it effectively. Similarly, National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen warned that the United States should return to bargaining on arms reduction only if it is able to deal with the Soviet Union from the position of strength. The fact that the administration adopted a hostile approach towards the Soviets and used confrontational rhetoric in conducting American-Soviet affairs suggested that the Cold War was once again well under way.

3. Analysis

President Reagan set the tone for American-Soviet relations at his first press conference of January 29, 1981 when he said that he believed in linkage because ". . . so far détente's been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims." While the use of the path metaphor suggests that the president wished to challenge the Nixon and Ford administrations for their handling of

the Soviets, there is little indication that he wanted to express his criticism in an open manner. Rather, the goal seemed to be to emphasize that, unlike his predecessors, Reagan would prioritize the notion of linkage over détente. The president reminded that the Soviets ". . . have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause" and that ". . . that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards" to differentiate between the morality of the Soviets and the Americans. The use of contrast indicates that he wanted to point out that the Soviets' means of action were inimical to his own, which was intended to convey that he fought for his cause using legal means, telling the truth and playing fair. He wished to bring to the public's attention the evil-nature of Communism; and he also did so in order to communicate to his listeners that he was a man of high integrity and morals. The aim was to prove his superiority over the opponents' methods – and by extension the opponents themselves. When he was asked about his opinion of the SALT treaty he replied: "I don't think that a treaty – SALT means strategic arms limitation – that actually permits a buildup, on both sides, of strategic nuclear weapons can properly be called that" and declared that he was ready ". . . to go in to negotiate . . . on the basis of trying to effect an actual reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons. That would then be real strategic arms limitation." The use of such words as "actual" and "real" suggests that the president wanted to set only the goals which he could realistically accomplish. He assured the public that he was not interested in expressions of goodwill and would pursue precise solutions of major problems, that he would not be satisfied with declarations for the future and would press the Soviets for concrete decisions and actions there and then, and that negotiations under his administration would not result in ephemeral change of climate but they would bring tangible and lasting change of substance. His goal was to provide policy proposals which were constructive alternatives to the former administrations' policies. Finally, Reagan pointed out that ". . . you can't sit down at a table and just negotiate . . . unless you take into account, in consideration at that table all the other things that are going on." In dealing with the Soviet leaders, Reagan had no illusion about the intentions of his adversaries and was pragmatic about the limits of mutual cooperation. As a staunch Cold War crusader with strong anti-Communist beliefs, he communicated to the Soviets that he was not going to improve ties with them at all costs, excluding the cost of surrender at negotiations. The president made clear to the Soviets that their restraint in their global actions and reciprocity in

foreign affairs were necessary to advance mutual relations. From his perspective, the U.S. and the Soviet Union could normalize mutual relations and develop a stable relationship only if the Soviets restrained their use of force, respected the independence of other nations, and complied with international obligations. He also suggested that should the Soviet Union fail to show genuine willingness to cooperate, the United States would have to resort to confrontation.

An analysis of Reagan's rhetorical choices in his most complete statements of the Cold War rhetoric demonstrates this resolve. To instigate anti-Soviet feeling among the American public, feeling toned down by his predecessors and their policies, Reagan bluntly portrayed the Soviet Union as evil. He labeled the Soviet Union as a "power untamed," a "totalitarian force" (1982), and an "evil empire" (March 8, 1983). Using the technique of stereotyping, focusing the target audience's attention on the features that it expected, Reagan presented a negative image of the Soviet system and its means of power. He reflected the fundamental evil nature and traits of Communism to present the object of his attack as something the listeners rejected, disdained, and hated. He called it a "regime," and a "[tyranny]" and its instruments of power "subversion," "conflict," "assault," and "violence" (1982). He also stirred up Americans' anti-Communist attitudes with the technique of demonizing the enemy, making people who supported and served the system appear to be cruel and barbarous. He described members of the Soviet leadership as people who "reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" and called their exercise of authority "oppression," "repression," "destruction" (1982), and "aggression" (March 23, 1983). In doing so, he aroused the feelings of abhorrence of and loathing for Communists, thus enabling him to re-escalate the Cold War tensions and to make it easier for the American public to realize that the defeat of the enemy was absolutely necessary. Reagan's decision to stereotype and demonize the opponent also appears to have been made in order to rationalize his potential controversial and debatable moves and actions taken against the Soviets. The president wanted to ensure that he and the public had a common understanding of the nature and means of the opposing system and shared the conviction that the existence and spread of Communism to other nations had to be stopped. The rhetoric of building common ground was also designed to bring Reagan closer to the audience. Aware that he was playing off the primary paradox of the Cold War, in which peace was guaranteed by the arms race and "star wars" programs, the president wanted to improve his public image and convince the world that he was not a warmonger,

but a pacifist, devoted to the American ideals of peace and liberty.

Reagan strengthened anti-Soviet feeling by exploiting emotional intimidation. He drew on the fear of war when, on the one hand, he persuaded Americans that there was "the threat of global war" (1982) and that ". . . a freeze . . . would raise, not reduce, the risks of war," but, on the other, he convinced the listeners that ". . . this is not to say that the Soviet Union is planning to make war on us" (March 23, 1983). He instilled anxieties in the general population when he stated that ". . . the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons – weapons that can strike directly at the United States" and when he asserted that the Soviet "conventional forces are trained and equipped not so much to defend against an attack as they are to permit sudden, surprise offensives of their own" (March 23, 1983). He aroused worries when he revealed that the Soviet "antennae fields and intelligence monitors are targeted on key U.S. military installations and sensitive activities" and when he disclosed that "On the small island of Grenada . . . the Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for?" (March 23, 1983). Bringing up the issue of war by denying that it should be brought up and posing the question about the purpose of the military facilities in Grenada without the expectation of a reply, Reagan wanted to distance himself from unfair assertions, while still invoking the subject matter, and avoid giving possible answers, while still encouraging the public to consider them. He raised the fear of attack by and of war with the Soviets because he believed that those appeals still played well with the American public. While he recognized that the threat of Communism at home was a matter of the past, he fed on the public's fear of the nuclear war, implying that a potential Soviet attack on the United States could make the Communist menace dangerous and real again. Making suggestions that the Soviets were planning an anti-American attack was a smart rhetorical effort. Presenting the Soviets as aggressors and, by extension, the Americans as defenders, reinforced a perception of Reagan's political integrity and credibility as a peacekeeper and strengthened support for his policies among rank-and-file voters.

The use of appeals to authority was also tactical, a technique of referring to a respected external authority to support one's arguments and simultaneously to discourage potential opposition. Aware of the strength of authoritative argument, Reagan paraphrased Winston S. Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech" – "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended

across the Continent" (1946) – when he said: "From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy" (1982). In a manner reminiscent of the prime minister's question regarding the Japanese aggressors – "What kind of a people do they think we are?" (1941) – posed in a 1941 address to the Congress of the United States Reagan asked Americans in the context of American-Soviet rivalry "What kind of people do we think we are?" (1982), thus appealing to their sense of freedom and democracy. Finally, he rephrased Churchill's statement – "We have come safely through the worst" (1945) – made in a speech entitled "Where Do We Stand?" when he concluded: ". . . we too have come through the worst. Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best . . ." (1982). The president's decision to argue his case using as an argument an appeal to authority reveals his strategic thinking and planning. Appealing to Churchill, a legitimate and unquestionable expert on the subject of war against the Soviets, Reagan encouraged the public to share his anti-Communist views and show support for his policies. To oppose him meant opposing Churchill. To criticize his decisions and proposed course of action was comparable to criticizing the prime minister. It should also be noted that the president's choice of the authority is symptomatic of his high political ambitions. Stressing that Churchill "had that special attribute of great statesmen – the gift of vision . . ." (1982) and suggesting that he himself shared this characteristic because he also set forth a task that "will long outlive our own generation" (1982), Reagan communicated to the audience that he too was a great statesman. Although it was too early to state conclusively, the fact that he used authoritative argument indicates that he wanted the listeners to think so.

Reagan tried to create for himself a public image through virtue words, such as "freedom," "peace," "democracy," "justice," and "security." By incorporating in the discourse the virtue words which were cherished in the audience's value system, he attempted to produce a positive self-image. He made associations to freedom and peace beneficial to him when he said: ". . . this is precisely our mission today: to preserve freedom as well as peace" (1982). He attached the qualities of democracy to himself when he stated that ". . . we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy" (1982). He identified himself with the American value of justice when he cited Amos 5:24 in the Bible: "'Yes, let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream'" (March 8, 1983). Finally he appealed to the value of security when he concluded that "national security" was

a problem "we must face together" (March 23, 1983). The appeals to higher values clearly demonstrate that Reagan wanted to show himself to the American public as a positive statesman, with strong moral values and beliefs. Moreover, the president's references to peace indicate that he wished to establish a rapport with the listeners to encourage them to evaluate his future political decisions and actions, however contentious they would be, on the basis of the values he believed in and which he would have them believe he shared with them. The quotes cited above show that his goal was to project an image of a man devoted to the cause of peacefully securing freedom, democracy, and justice for the entire world and willing to pursue policies that could help to achieve those purposes. Finally, his use of virtue words indicate that he wished to give substance to his strident anti-Soviet rhetoric and demonstrate that his confrontational anti-Communist public speaking served American purposes. Realizing that he often conveyed his foreign policy ideas using the combative rhetoric of war, he did not want the public to see him as a ruthless anti-Soviet crusader but rather as a responsible Cold War statesman.

To that end, Reagan also avoided winning American support only through emotions. He would rather engage in the rational examination of his views and proposed policies, providing facts backed by what seemed to be well prepared and carefully researched and referenced data. For instance, to support his claim that "For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous military might" he cited the fact that since 1969 the Soviet Union ". . . has built five new classes of ICBM's, and upgraded these eight times," ". . . built 4 new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and over 60 new missile submarines," and ". . . built over 200 new Backfire bombers . . . ." Regarding conventional forces, he quoted that since 1974 "the United States has produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft" and ". . . the Soviet Union has produced twice as many. . . . For armored vehicles, including tanks, we have produced 11,200. The Soviet Union has produced 54,000 – nearly 5 to 1 in their favor" (March 23, 1983). Aware that arguments based on facts laid good groundwork for arguments reflecting one's convictions and beliefs and that statistics provided objective bases for an unbiased/unpartisan judgment, Reagan used facts and figures to convince the public that his defense policy proposals were right, and, by implication, the assumptions regarding the reasons for these policies were also right. He used favorable data to rationalize questionable decisions concerning his administration's defense programs and to justify actions taken to carry those decisions out. In a manner

reminiscent of his Cold War predecessors, who used political rationalization as a tool in American-Soviet warfare, Reagan made claims that the Soviet Union was outdistancing the United States in the production of both offensive and defensive forces and creating a seeming U.S. deficiency. To impel U.S. actions on the issue, Reagan drew on rationalization to convince the public that the United States needed more strategic weapons. The use of contrast, which exposed the differences between the two superpowers' arsenals and conveyed the military gap between them, greatly reinforced the president's position and strengthened support for it.

4. Outcome

Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Union's longtime ambassador to the United States, (1995: 482, 495) wrote in, *In Confidence*, that Reagan's aggressive public stand during his first term as president managed to create a solid front of hostility among the Soviet leaders. His vehement rhetorical attacks generated indignation and anger among members of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the security apparatus. Dobrynin (1995: 482) notes that the Soviet leadership interpreted Reagan's first press conference statements concerning the Soviet Union as "extremely hostile," "unprecedented and unprovoked." In response to Reagan's address to the British Parliament, the Moscow Domestic Service (Kengor 2006: 143) called the speech "'notorious'" and the official spokesman of the Soviet leadership (Kengor 2006: 143) described it as a declaration to destroy the Soviet Union. Regarding the address, the twenty-sixth Party Congress (Kengor 2006: 143-144) wrote in its report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that Reagan employed "an entire system of means geared to undermining the socialist world and causing it to disintegrate." In its comments to the Evil Empire speech, the Soviet leadership (Garthoff 1994: 111) stated that the president established a new propaganda program to carry out his political and ideological crusade. General Secretary Yuri V. Andropov (Garthoff 1994: 111) reacted to the Star Wars speech in a similar tone when in a statement for *Pravda*, the Soviet government's chief mouthpiece, he said:

> The present U.S. administration continues to tread an extremely perilous path. Issues of peace and war must not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union are futile. The Soviet Union will never let that happen. . . . It is time they stopped thinking up one option after another in search of the best way

of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. To do this is not just irresponsible, it is madness.

Andropov's statement was subsequently echoed and reinforced by lower-ranking officials and the Soviet media.

In using fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric, Reagan also managed to build his image, his worldview, and his political style. In the eyes of the Soviet leadership, as Dobrynin (1995: 478, 482, 495) observes, Reagan was an adventurer and a provocateur, looking for a pretext for public confrontation. His rhetoric was designed to create an image of a hard line Cold War crusader determined to go after the Soviet leaders with a vengeance. As Dobrynin (1995: 481, 484, 487, 490, 502, 504) notes, the president created the impression that his tough talk was not only his political pose but that his personal anti-Communist conviction was fundamental to his view of and attitude towards the Soviet leaders and to everything he said or did regarding them. It was the observation of the Soviet leadership that Reagan believed he owed his presidential power to the American public's support for his anti-Communist approach and he was determined to devote his term in office to confirm his anti-Soviet stand. As the Soviet leadership saw it, Reagan took a primitive and incompetent approach to American-Soviet affairs which reflected his lack of knowledge of many intricacies of mutual relations and the substance of the ongoing negotiations. In a self-righteous manner, reminiscent of the Carter administration, he used propaganda to escalate the sense of distrust and suspicion between the American and Soviet administrations and paralyze any chances for constructive negotiations.

Whether this was really Reagan's intention or it was mostly for public consumption cannot explicitly be stated, the more so because there were some hesitant signs of interest on the president's part in the development of favorable mutual relations. From the beginning of his term in office, Reagan sent mixed signals to the Soviet leadership, attacking it in public while at the same time seeking normalizations of relations with it in private. He made his first attempt to start a dialogue with the Soviet leaders in April 1981 when he sent a personal, handwritten letter to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in which he recalled their first meeting at San Clemente in 1973, referred to Brezhnev's assurance of his dedication to peace, and evoked the hopes of ordinary people for personal autonomy and security. In September of the next year, he wrote to Brezhnev again, assuring the general secretary of America's intention to develop good relations with the Soviet Union. Two months later, the president paid a visit to the

Soviet Embassy where he offered condolences for Brezhnev's death. In February 1983, he held a private meeting with Dobrynin, his first substantive conversation as president with a senior Soviet representative. During the meeting, Reagan suggested establishing a personal and confidential channel of communication with the general secretary which could operate through contacts between the secretary of state and the Soviet ambassador, asked for exit visas for Pentecostal Christian fundamentalists living in the U.S Embassy in Moscow since 1978, and stated his position on both the strategic arms limitation talks and nuclear arms in Europe. In July of the same year, the president sent a handwritten letter to General Secretary Yuri V. Andropov, in which he tried to convince the Soviet leader of his readiness to conduct confidential exchanges and of the value of various American proposals advanced on a number of issues. Reagan also made attempts to explore areas of agreement with the Soviet leadership through the Department of State. In September 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko met to discuss the possibilities of negotiating the Euromissile. In January next year, they met again to talk about nuclear arms limitations and the situation in the areas of conflict. In September, Gromyko met with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and discussed regional problems, the adherence to the Helsinki accords, nuclear nonproliferation, limits of the arms race, and human rights. There were also numerous private meetings between the secretaries of state or the deputy secretaries of state and the Soviet ambassador, meetings designed to facilitate the development of mutual relations by establishing first contacts, explaining each side's positions, easing tensions, or overcoming impasses.

For all those attempts to develop favorable relations with the Soviet Union, why did Reagan fail to advance the process of normalization of American-Soviet affairs, why did he stop it and even reverse it? A possible answer is that during his first term in office the president was not really interested in improving Washington's relations with Moscow. Convinced that America's ability to build a stable and tranquil world depended on its ability to negotiate from a position of strength, Reagan was intent on initiating a massive military buildup and achieving a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. Moreover, given the context of presidential re-elections and Reagan's intention to run for a second term, it seems that the president might have vested important personal interests in offering gestures of goodwill towards the Soviets. Taking steps which showed that Washington was trying to promote good relations with Moscow, Reagan

wanted to mute his critics and convince the public that improvement of relations between the two superpowers was underway, while, in fact, his gestures were prompted only by electoral considerations and propaganda. One final consideration is that as a newcomer to Washington's foreign politics, the president was not prepared to discuss questions concerning American-Soviet relations confidently. The division of responsibilities for the development of a dialogue with the Soviets among the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense made reaching this goal even more difficult. Reagan needed experience and expertise to handle the issues regarding mutual affairs responsibly.

5. Conclusion

The analysis of Reagan's early presidential discourse and the Soviet leadership's reaction to the president's oratory shows that Washington's anti-Soviet rhetoric was yet another factor responsible for hindering the process of normalization of relations with Moscow. While Reagan's choice of rhetorical devices was not the only reason why a personal dialogue between the leaders of the two superpowers failed, their personal correspondence lapsed, and formal talks between the two governments stalled, the president's oratory had a strong effect on the shape of mutual relations, thriving on ideological differences dividing the two powers instead of reconciling them, intensifying tensions instead of soothing them, aggravating issues of dispute instead of solving them. Although the Reagan administration resumed official discussions and held meetings between the secretaries of state and the Soviet leaders and ambassador, it failed to successfully pursue accommodation with the Soviet leadership. The role of the president in the failed attempt to perform the task was crucial. As a foreign policy leader, Reagan set the United States on a rhetorical and political course which departed from the lines followed by his predecessors. The use of the techniques of stereotyping and demonizing, of the appeals to authority and reason, and the exploitation of fear leading to intimidation conveyed the president's ardent and confrontational posture and his intention to return to an antagonistic and hostile oratory. Gone were Nixon's era of negotiations and the policy of détente. Reagan instead rested his rhetoric and policies on opposing the Soviets and everything associated with them through provocation and confrontation. He launched an anti-Communist campaign, denouncing the Soviet ideology, system,

and those who adhered to them and initiated a massive military buildup, aimed at reaching a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and eliminating the Soviet power from the world stage. While Reagan's rhetoric alone did not reverse the process of accommodation and cooperation with the Soviets started by the president's predecessors, it did not advance it either. As the analysis of Reagan's discourse has shown, however, it was not meant to. The president wanted to go back to the era of confrontation and he chose the rhetorical devices which helped him achieve that purpose.

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Ronald Reagan: język i ideologia

Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia analizę retoryki zimnej wojny Prezydenta Ronalda Reagana na przykładzie tekstów, które najpełniej wyrażają jego poglądy ideologiczne. Autor omawia narzędzia retoryczne użyte przez prezydenta do rozpoczęcia ofensywy przeciwko Sowietom i w oparciu o reakcje władz sowieckich na jego wystąpienia próbuje ocenić, czy Reaganowi udało się zaostrzyć relacje amerykańsko-sowieckie. Celem artykułu jest pokazanie osobistego wkładu prezydenta w eskalację konfliktu.

Słowa kluczowe: Ronald Reagan, język, komunizm, zimna wojna

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THE RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION

This article examines the functioning of rhetoric in public discourse, in particular a rhetoric that emphasizes the importance of reaching accommodation with people and consensus building, called the rhetoric of reconciliation. The conditions for the rhetoric of reconciliation include: 1) a given rhetorical situation that consist of an issue, a conflict situation that can be either viewed as something that has existed for ever and therefore underlies the sources of any relation, or is treated as only a stage in the history of a relation that occurred after a time of agreement and unity; 2) the opening to dialogue that requires primarily self-definition, a definition of one's identity, demarcating boundaries and then, acknowledging the individuality (uniqueness) of the Other, 3) the language of empathy for reducing the degree of defensiveness in reaching an agreement; 4) the ethos of the speaker, based on knowledge, friendliness and openness. An important element of the rhetoric of reconciliation is opening gestures, i.e., such signs and conduct, both verbal and non-verbal, that express a readiness and willingness to dialogue and understanding. However, the rhetoric of reconciliation should be distinguished from the "empty" rhetoric (sophistry) that restricts itself to making gestures only. The difference between them relates to intention – the standing and the attitude of the rhetor, ethical issues and goals to be attained. The "empty" rhetoric suits only immediate and spectacular gestures of reconciliation of expedient nature, whereas the rhetoric of reconciliation undertakes efforts that will last for years or even decades.

Key words: dispute, the rhetoric of reconciliation, dialogue, the language of empathy

1. Between conflict and reconciliation

It can be said that the nature of social relations and basic everyday life situations is marked by the fact that we live in a society of ubiquitous communication.[1] Thus, by being deprived of one definite type of meta-narrative, we are exposed to a multiplicity and diversity of worldviews that are constantly competing with one another. This means we live in a world where knowledge, needs, interests, value systems and religions are confronted, a world of continuous

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1. These issues have been extensively discussed, for example, by Gianni Vattimo in *The transparent Society* (1992).

clashes between different visions of the world and of imposing convictions (see Caputo 1993: 102; 1987: 262). Consequently, we begin to perceive the world as a battlefield and people as enemies. The American sociolinguist Deborah Tannen (1999: 3-4) notes that often the easiest way to achieve one's goal is to stand in opposition to someone or something, the most favorable method of discussing an issue is to organize a debate, and the most ingenious way of propagating information is to find people who will express it in an extremely different manner by presenting completely polarized views and opinions on that particular issue. On the contrary, we witness attempts, visible e.g., in social thought of Rawls (1999) or Habermas (1984), to seek consensus, a common language and measures for incommensurable, some kind of communication transparency.[2] Finally, at a political life level, the political correctness is used to deal with social conflicts. However, these issues require a separate discussion.

The linguistic and rhetorical observations of human functioning in such a reality in Poland have resulted in studies on the linguistic phenomena of specific situations of competition and rivalry, i.e. hate speech and hate rhetoric[3]

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2.   More on this issue, see Gianni Vattimo (1997: 33-34).

3.   According to Głowiński (2007) the basic properties of the rhetoric of hate are, first of all, the dichotomous divisions which have a universal nature and embrace everything within. In terms of grammatical categories it is the us–them opposition. The consequence of such a constructed relation is the exclusion of the possibility for dialogue and predetermined evaluation patterns. The rhetoric of hate does not address those who are its objects. They are not spoken to but are spoken about, and everything that can be said about "them" is meant to bear witness against them and to discredit them. Dichotomous divisions are closely connected with perceiving the world in terms of a great conspiracy. Those standing on the other side are organizing themselves against us, trying to harm us, wanting to take away what is ours. The resulting image of the world thus becomes black and white, and everything is built on antitheses: one's own – stranger, friend – foe, good – bad, true Pole – anti-Pole, patriot – traitor, etc. Another factor distinguishing the rhetoric of hate is absolute truths. These truths always apply to only one side – our side – and we are entitled to them without discussion. These truths are the only right and obvious ones, so they cannot be subject to comments or reflections. Whoever dares to question them becomes, by virtue of that fact, a suspect, and may even have joined the ranks of the opponents. After all, the role of the agent in the rhetoric of hate is given particular attention. The agent speaks truths that are considered to be ultimate and formulates his/her statements in an extremely authoritarian manner. What is important is that he/she does not have to be an authority him or herself, nor have any charisma or merit, because the fact that the ideology he/she represents or what he/she says is considered "right" by others justifies everything (Głowiński 2007: 23-26).

(Kowalski, Tulli 2003; Głowiński 2007), the rhetoric of exclusion[4] (Witosz 2010, Wodak 2008) or the rhetoric of domination[5] (Wasilewski 2006). These phenomena, characteristic for conflict situations, where a conflict, using a term proposed by Louis Kriesberg (1998), is a destructive one, i.e., aiming at overcoming or destroying an opponent and not at seeking or finding a solution to a problem, for several years have been considered predominant in Polish social life (Głowiński 2007, Kowalski, Tulli 2003, Sobczak 2011). Although conflict and its manifestations, such as fighting, rivalry and dispute, constitute an integral part of social life, there is the other extreme – of the peace and harmony achieved by resolving a conflict. Georg Simmel (Simmel 1995), a classical representative of German sociology, considers victory, the situation when the opponent surrenders, as the most radical yet simplest way for ending a dispute. A conflict ended this way is based on a declaration that one of the parties has been defeated and gives up any forms of resistance against the opponent. Besides victory, other ways for ending a dispute include reconciliation and compromise, of which the latter is, according to Simmel, one of the greatest discoveries of humankind (Simmel 1995: 338). The compromise is based on a particular attitude of both parties involved in the conflict. It is achieved through an exchange of an object value mutually acknowledged

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4.   The rhetoric of exclusion is present in different ways in various types of discourse, depending closely on a specific statement and its context (Wodak, 2008: 187). However, for it the most important category is the opposition between "us" and "them". "Us" are people belonging to a given community – social, national, mental, being aware of belonging to it, but also of being dependent on other members of a given group. Limits of belonging to such group are always clearly specified and protect a discourse subject against external influences. Thus, it refrains from a dialog with the unknown. It is not motivated by curiosity, seeking knowledge and understanding of others and the world. This underlays the style of its communication, which is one-sided, aiming at promoting its own perception of the world, own axiological order and own attitudes. "Them", on the other hand, must be stigmatized and excluded, and basic tools for exclusion are various discreditation strategies, including depersonalization (Witosz, 2010: 15-18).

5.   As Jacek Wasilewski shows in his study *Retoryka dominacji* (2006), a relationship of domination can be found everywhere. It is universal amongst people and present at every organizational level. It is a part of cultural non-verbal (e.g., a dominant person can do a specific thing to a subordinate, but not otherwise) as well as verbal behaviors. A dominance can also be achieved and maintained using rhetoric tools. Main dominant rhetoric tools include: designing basic social roles of dominant character such as paternalism and infantilization; controlling a rhythm and a course of a conversation; demanding proofs of respect and emphasizing social roles; categorical directiveness and driving force; a right to identify with a dominant group and to exclude from it; valuation and assessment; unjustified breaking of conversation rules; breaking taboos or depriving of dignity. These manipulations aim at emphasizing powers of the sender and treat the recipient as an object subjected to symbolic subjugating activities. What is important, the dominance may result from a rhetoric organization of a relevant subject and not from the actual social advantage of the sender (Wasilewski 2006:488-489).

by both parties. This value is precisely expressed in other ways. Something valuable is given up because a desired value can be obtained in some other form. According to Simmel, compromise, as opposed to reconciliation characterized by significant subjectivity, is objective because it is reached by mutual concessions which can refer to external criteria independent of the parties involved. This form of ending a conflict depends on the particular skills of the people who locate it in the spiritual sphere of humans and juxtapose it with such human traits as obstinacy. Therefore, assuming the social life oscillates between the two extremes of peace and fight, and the rhetoric of conflict have been theoretically discussed in numerous papers, I would like to explore conditions for existence and characteristics of the rhetoric specific for building peace. This rhetoric attempts to ask questions about possibilities for social consensus and understanding. Considering its objectives it can be termed the rhetoric of reconciliation.

2. Conditions for the rhetoric of reconciliation
2.1. Myth of hostility „at the source"

The term „reconciliation" means establishing a close relationship, to become compatible or consistent, to settle or to resolve, as well a situation in which two people, countries, etc., re-establish friendly relations after quarrelling (*Longman English Dictionary Online*). The presupposition of reconciliation assumes that there is some kind of split, division, which is expressed as a conflict, hostility, war, hatred or resentment. These divisions may apply to two situations. Firstly, a conflict can be seen as something that has always existed and therefore lies at the root of any relations. Secondly, a conflict is treated only as a stage in the history of a relation which followed after a time of agreement and unity. A good example of the former situation are, for example, Polish-German relations and

Polish-Russian relations[6]; in the second case these are the post-Solidarity political party relations in Poland after 1989[7]. These two rhetorical contexts require two different types of rhetoric. Beginning with the end, when we assume that first we were one and then we parted, then we build up a rhetoric that refers to the past, to some original state of happiness, a golden age when everything was perfect. We thus show that our common roots – of those who left at some point

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6.   Relationships between Poland and Russia and Germany have developed for over 1000 years, thus it is difficult to sum them up in a few sentences. However, significant in both cases is that these relationships have been marked by armed conflicts and disputes over borders. Particularly important for these relations are three partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia and Austria in the years 1772-1795, as well as events of the 20th century: Polish-Soviet war (1919-1921) and German-Soviet pact made in 1939 (Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact) called the fourth partition of Poland as its secret protocol contained division of the spheres of influence in the Eastern Europe: Germans were granted Polish lands up to rivers Narew, Pisa, Wisła and San, and the USSR were given the eastern part of Poland (east of those rivers). Bad Polish-German relations also resulted from other events of the previous century, including Nazi German attack on Poland (September 1, 1939), annexation of Polish lands: the Land of the Warta river, the Silesian voivodeship and the Gdansk district; creation of the General Governorate, the anti-Polish policy, and deportations of Poles to Germany to work as forced labor and to concentration camps. Whereas it can be said in brief that Polish-Russian relationships were affected by events of the twentieth century including the USSR attack on Poland on September 17, 1939, Katyn massacre (see footnote 8 below), and the times of the People's Republic of Poland and its subjugation to the USSR. This complicated history brought about numerous antagonisms, but also stereotypes in Polish perception of Germany and Germans, as well as Russia and Russians (they were discussed in various papers, e.g., *Polacy i Niemcy. Z badań nad kształtowaniem heterostereotypów etnicznych. Zbiór studiów*, ed. K. Wajda or *Obrazy Rosji i Rosjan w Polsce od końca XIX wieku do początku XXI stulecia. Myśl polityczna – media – opinia publiczna*, ed. E. Kirwiel, E. Maj and E. Podgajna).

7.   1989 was a breakthrough year for Poland, and for the whole Europe. Poland underwent a systemic transformation. The country transformed from a communist, centralized system into a democratic republic with government bodies elected in general elections. Since that year, the Polish political scene has evolved continuously. The main successor of the Polish United Workers Party was the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland established in 1990. The former activists of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union "Solidarity" (NSZZ "Solidarność") were, at first, gathered in parties including the Liberal Democratic Congress, the Democratic Union, Centre Agreement (all established in 1990) or the Christian National Union (founded in 1989). In 1996, the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) was established, consisting of a number of post-Solidarity formations, including NSZZ „Solidarność", the Christian-Democratic Party or the Centre Agreement and the Christian National Union mentioned above. However, ideological disputes and personal conflicts resulted in breaks and rotations in these parties. Soon some of activists left the Democratic Union establishing the Conservative Party, and in 1994, the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress merged forming the Freedom Union. It, in turn, was dissolved, again, following program disputes, and in 2001 some of its members established the Democratic Party and other the Civic Platform, currently having the majority in Polish Parliament. In the same year, the AWS split into the Law and Justice (currently, one of the major opposition parties in Poland) and, now dissolved, the League of Polish Families. This short and brief description is only an indication of complex relations in the Polish political scene. Although in last 20 years in Poland many parties derived and derive their ideological origin from the "Solidarity" movement, yet, despite common background, personal antagonisms and differences in interpreting various historical events make their cooperation impossible and hinder mutual understanding.

– are common, are ours, fraternal, despite the dispersion. As a result we have a mythical basis to reconcile in the first place and, secondly, we do not need to build a new "us", only to restore the original "us". We refer thus to an existing community, with its specific features, values, common history and accomplishments. This original "us" is also treated as a kind of commitment, an argument to be used when calling for reconciliation.

A completely different rhetoric is involved in the first case, in which another myth is referred to which proclaims the existence of some "source" of hostility as something that was at the very beginning or that has always existed. For example, in their cultural consciousness Poles are convinced that the Germans – stereotypically presented as Teutonic knights, Nazis and then a leading Member State of the European Union – have always threatened Polish sovereignty (see Bartmiński 2007, Wajda 1991). Similar concerns involve our eastern neighbor, Russia (see Kępiński 1995, Kirwiel, Maj, Podgajna 2011). When this is the case, and you cannot refer to some mythical common past as one unity, reconciliation must be a matter of what is to come. This means then that such a rhetoric must begin its narration with a declaration of closure of the past and an opening up to what is to come, and it builds an area of hope and faith in atonement as something that is yet to be achieved, but is indeed possible. As Bronisław Komorowski said during his speech in Katyń on 10 April 2011, one year after the Smoleńsk crash:[8]

> "Whilst appreciating the gesture of goodwill of President Dmitry Medvedev, who bowed his head before the murdered Polish heroes, **we must not forget the past but at the same time we must concentrate on the future. We need not give in to the fatalism of history, the fatalism behind which lurks a temptation of imperial domination or fear of this domination. Poland and Russia, despite all the differences, can shape the relations between the two countries so that this fatalism of the past can be overcome.**" (emphasis mine, BS)

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8. The Smoleńsk crash was the Polish military plane crash that took place on 10 April 2010 in Smoleńsk, Russia. A total of 96 people died in the crash, including President Lech Kaczyński, his wife, deputy marshals of the Sejm and Senate, a group of MPs, commanders of all the armed forces in Poland, the President's office staff, heads of state institutions, representatives of the clergy, ministries, social and veteran organisations and the families of Polish officers murdered by NKVD officers (the Soviet political police) in Katyń in 1940. The passengers of the plane were a Polish delegation on its way to attend the ceremony to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Katyń massacre. This tragic event first united Poles, but with time it has become a tool of political struggle and a source of conflict between the government and the opposition (in particular by the Law and Justice party headed by Jarosław Kaczyński, the late President's twin brother).

Referring to mythical thinking has a persuasive dimension in the rhetoric of reconciliation. This way of speaking is meant to justify desired changes in the world, to instill certain action. But before the process of command has been commenced, before the answer is provided to the question as to why a change is necessary, the problem has to be diagnosed – given a name and explained why things are happening the way they are. This is where myth turns out to be useful which, as Roland Barthes (1984: 10-11) says, makes what is cultural seem natural, self-evident, existing from the beginning, the source. Myth requires no justification. It provides and maintains, in turn, a pattern of understanding of the world and humans, it justifies certain processes and their outcomes, and by creating a system of coordinating beliefs that are present within a given community, it maintains the social order.[9] Mythical stories – the myth of a golden age and of disarmament, the myth of a primeval conflict and the vision of a new, better tomorrow explain the nature of relations between the parties and provide a justification for change.

2. The Other or a Stranger?

The conflict situation assumes setting up a relation between the parties involved in the dichotomy of: my own group (similar to myself) and the other.[10] The other is a stranger, an enemy, one that has not yet been defined by us. Someone who does not belong to a given community, family; a citizen of another country; someone who is at a distance from one's own group culturally, ideologically, territorially, therefore he/she cannot be trusted. There is no common feature that can be shared, no starting point that could help develop any kind of relation. This division carries certain implications in terms of creating the reality of rhetoric. By creating the "others" they must be endowed with the worst possible features. The others are strange, unpredictable, want to destroy us – one could only expect the worst from them. The enemy is constructed from stereotypes.

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9.   The functions of myth have been evaluated by many authors, including Joseph Campbell (1988), Roger Caillois (1999), Claude Levi-Strauss (1991), Bronisław Malinowski (1926), Roland Barthes (1984) and Mircea Eliade (1963)

10.   See Social Identity Theory. Henri Tajfel and Hohn C.Turner (1986) explain the effect of own membership in a group on perception of oneself, one's group and other groups. They particularly focus on individuals strive to maintain or improve their self-esteem by becoming members of groups ensuring positive identification or by depreciating a status and a value of other, competitive groups (e.g., by assigning morally negative features to them).

What is alien triggers prejudices, fears and feelings of disgust and repulsion which are deeply rooted in the human psyche and subconscious (Bauman 1991). The category of "foreignness" allows to commence and then justify hostile attitudes and attempts to destroy what is alien.

A *sine qua non* condition for reconciliation thus transforms the Stranger (with all the negative connotations connected with this notion) into the Other. The category of otherness, although often used interchangeably with the category of foreignness, has a different meaning. It is a much broader concept. Every Alien is the Other, but not every Other is an Alien (Witosz 2010: 20). Otherness has many colours. The Other may mean completely "alien", with whom any communication or agreement is impossible because the temporal, mental or spatial gap is too wide. At this point the notions of otherness and foreignness merge semantically. But the Other can mean as much as differing in relation to something, and then the Other becomes the other extreme of the "same" category. In this case with the Other, which can be a Jew to a Catholic, a Pole to a German or a liberal-minded person to an orthodox-minded one, agreement is possible because the Other is the one we confront. The Other denotes the existence of a difference, but it carries no negative content connected with foreignness (Gruchlik 2001).

This change of perspective, the transformation of the Alien into the Other, does not only provide the opportunity to reinterpret stereotypes and discuss the sources of hostility, foreignness and conflict, but also allows to change the "us–them" relation into an "I-Thou" one. And only this change allows us to transform hostility into partnership, and the sense of feeling endangered, the need to fight and compete into a dialogue.

2.3. Reconciliation and dialogue

The base for a dialogue is another prerequisite for the rhetoric of reconciliation. For Martin Buber (2000), one of the most outstanding representatives of the philosophy of dialogue, a dialogue as a form of communication is the result of an encounter with another person, whom Buber calls "Thou". The encounter gives one the opportunity to establish a real relationship between I and Thou – real as in one where the other person is not seen as an object of observation but as a subject constituting its own entity. The dialogue is not a form of appropriation or reign, but it is based on a double movement: of quasi distancing oneself and of relationships (Kłoczowski 2005: 52-53). The quasi distance means

acknowledging the primordial, fundamental distance, acknowledging the fact that You are Thou. As Buber (2000) concludes, a real conversation, and therefore every valid fulfillment of human relations, constitutes the acceptance of otherness, thus calling someone "Thou" should be embedded in the genuine acknowledgement of one's separate and personal entity which is ultimately formed and represents a given standpoint. On the other hand, an attitude excluding dialogue is one that objectifies and relegates Thou to the level of It. Where objectification appears the attitude of partnership disappears, and any form of dialogue is out of the question (Jantos 1997: 55-56).

Michał Januszkiewicz (2007: 235-245) specifies three ways of objectification. The first one involves appropriation of the Other. This is achieved in one of two ways: by reducing otherness, i.e. when we reduce the Other to our dimension – we do not discern what is different and only focus instead on what is shared. In other words: appropriation means here reducing what is unknown to something that is known and is a form of "dissolving" the otherness. But the Other can also be appropriated by some form of "repair". We may want to change the other, convert him/her, make him/her one of us. This appropriating approach is one of domination of one of the subjects and highlights the imbalance of relations of the parties involved. Its result is unifying and destroying what is different. The second way of objectification involves elimination of the Other. If there is no way to include someone in the community, he/she must be excluded. In social life such an exclusion may involve omission and concealment, but in extreme cases – as shown by acts of any violence, including war – exclusion also means annihilation. Thirdly, we can ignore the Other, remain irrelevant towards him/her. Dialogue must obviously have nothing to do with elimination, indifference, but it also has nothing to do with appropriation or bringing down, as Januszkiewicz says (Januszkiewicz 2010: 142), to a "common denominator" because, citing Gadamer:

> In mitmenschlichen Verhalten kommt es darauf an (…), das Du als Du wirklich zu erfahren, d.h. seinen Anspruch nicht zu überhören und sich etwas von ihm sagen zu lassen. Dazu gehört offenheit. (…) Offentlichkeit für den anderen schließt also die Anerkennung ein, daß ich in mir etwas gegen mich gelten lassen muß, auch wenn es keinen

anderen gäbe, der es gegen mich geltend machte. (Gadamer 1990: 367)[11]

Determining the plane for dialogue requires that first of all one define oneself, one's own identity, one's defined boundaries and then – acknowledge the otherness of the Other. For Emmanuel Levinas (1981) the symbol of this otherness is a person's *Face*, while the symbol of direct proximity is the face-to-face encounter. The condition for this encounter is, however, separation, i.e. perceiving and acknowledging the Other as an individual and holistic being. It should be noted that reconciliation is not based on removing boundaries, as a removal of borders may be an expression of lack of respect for otherness, for what is foreign and different and may even conceal the hidden agenda of incorporating what is other into what is ours. Thus, in fact it is destroying what bothers us and transforming it in the spirit of our "us" by way of coercion, persuasion or manipulation. The Other, as understood by Levinas, is understood as someone absolutely different, radically different. If somebody is entirely different than I am then I cannot categorize him/her according to my imaginative, conceptual and axiological networks. The appearance of the Other puts me in a situation of ethical obligation towards him/her. I become in a sense a servant to the Other, and my task is to respond to his/her call.

An example that reconciliation is not a removal of boundaries, but first of all a highlighting of their very existence and expressing respect towards them, is the ecumenical movement in the Church. The movement's intention is not to eliminate boundaries between the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches. If so, that idea is extended far into the future – to some unspecified time. At the moment, the purpose of reconciliation is to understand where these boundaries lie, what their meaning is and that they need to be respected. The will for a dialogue also forces one to assume a position where a conversation is not so much started with a presentation of one's own convictions, but, just the opposite, with a "suspension" or "bracketing" of one's own beliefs, since to acknowledge the Other is to acknowledge that he/she may be right (Gadamer 2003). Gadamer's approach to the dialogue differs from that of, e.g. Habermas (1984) who

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11.   „In human relations the important thing is to really experience Thou as Thou, i.e., to let someone tell one something or to let something be told to one is the core of this relation. This is what openness is all about. (…) The subject does not impose his or her point of view and tries to absorb the other by overhearing its claim. Openness to the other means that he or she listens to and hears the other's claim, and that includes the acknowledgment of the fact that I have to validate within myself something that I may strongly oppose even if there were nobody who could validate it against my will" (own translation).

emphasizes its scientific and argumentative dimension. Gadamer understands the dialog more in the rhetorical and Platonic sense, as initiating a conversation, and participating in a conversation during which readiness to understand and agree is continuously present. Agreement means occurrence of truth, something that the other person wants to communicate to us. It is not an appropriating truth, expressing domination, but rather something born during a conversation, which is conducted in agreement that both parties are open and try to understand each other. In this way we move on to the next condition for the rhetoric of reconciliation.

2.4. Language of reconciliation

It needs to be said that reconciliation is a special kind of agreement, or that agreement precedes reconciliation. There can be no reconciliation without some kind of preliminary agreement on an issue, be it at the political, social, existential or ethical level. Agreement does not mean *a priori* concessions granted to the interlocutor, but is the result of the process of reaching common views. It is an agreement that stipulates the solution to a given problem. It requires that certain conditions be established and that predefined rules be complied with. One of them is definitely that objective criteria be applied. In the rhetoric of reconciliation, justifying one's standpoints requires referring to the rules that have been accepted by both sides – these may include habits, customs, the practices of some given industry, accepted authority figures, consultants or legal acts. There can be no absolute truths spoken by an authoritative entity. The rhetoric of reconciliation also requires the use of a specific language.

In conflict situations there are two communication styles that pertain to the particular attitudes of the agents in a given dispute: the language of aggression/ hate, which is characteristic of defensive attitudes, and the language of empathy, which allows to reduce the degree of defensiveness in reaching an agreement (Gibb 1961; Rosenberg 2003; Sobczak 2011). When the narrating subject expects other people to comply with his/her demands, he/she does not respect the rights of others to self-determination and overgeneralizes, and behind his/her statements are ready-made judgments about people and the world – then we are dealing with the language of hate. The language of empathy implies, in turn, sincerity, the ability to listen and understand others' points of view, and the assumption of the equality of communication partners (Gibb 1961). The rhetoric

of reconciliation needs the language of empathy, and thus the use of assertions, not directives. It avoids statements that judge and valuate, preferring instead a description that is most neutral axiologically. Any destructive criticism and interpretation of others' behavior that is based on unfounded superstition prevents reconciliation. The same applies to overgeneralization and the use of quantifiers. References to "all", "many" and "everyone" serve to highlight one's power and advantage, but they are also a means of exclusion. The rhetoric of reconciliation does not introduce divisions and opposing sides, it highlights instead the notion of "community", "cooperation" and "acting together". An example for implementation of such rhetoric was a statement in a TV announcement made by Prime Minister Donald Tusk in December 2012 commemorating the 31st anniversary of the introduction of martial law in Poland. The key word in this message is the word "together":

> "We Poles are a great nation and one that becomes stronger when we stick **together**. **Together** we are in a position to help others and enjoy this **together**. **Together** we can build and win. **Together** we can enjoy time and celebrate. Christmas is approaching,it is a time of appeasement. Let us sit around a common table as one Polish family and from now on let us **be together**, because we really have only each other."

"Together" means despite any political, worldview-related or ideological differences. Tusk creates a community based on origin – "we are Poles" – but also activates a myth, deeply rooted in the Polish mentality, that Poles facing difficult situations can work together, unite and walk shoulder to shoulder. The Prime Minister made that appeal in response to statements of many opposition politics who in their rhetoric often refer to division. The divisions make us weak; working together is to give a sense of strength to the Poles.

2. 5. Rhetoric of reconciliation versus empty rhetoric

An important element of the rhetoric of reconciliation are the gestures of openness, i.e. such signs and behaviour, verbal and non-verbal, that express one's willingness to take part in a dialogue and mutual agreement. The non-verbal signs are symbolic gestures, such as shaking hands, taking part in anniversary celebrations, and laying a wreath at a place of worship. When they are of a verbal nature they are performatives: promises, commitments but also

– apologies[12]. In case of performatives, conditions to be met for making them effective actions are of importance. They were specified by John Austin. For a successful performative:

> "A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
>
> A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
>
> B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
>
> B.2) completely.
>
> C.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then **a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further**
>
> C.2) **must actually so conduct themselves subsequently**" (Austin 1962: 14, emphasis mine - BS)

In the context of the rhetoric of reconciliation, it seems to be key to draw attention especially to the third condition – the appointment of a certain procedure, uttering some formula in good faith, in this case with the intention of genuine reconciliation. It is not uncommon for gestures of openness to be empty gestures[13]. We can then speak of a superficial reconciliation, as the only thing that has changed is the language of the debate, but not the way the opponents view one another. It is worth asking why, in the context of the rhetoric of reconciliation, the rhetoric so often stops at the level of empty gestures, declarations or for effect. It seems to be a consequence of circumstances, in which it appears. The rhetoric often responds to unusual events, tragic, dramatic or deeply moving ones. Extemporariness is usually involved and basically neither what is to come

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12. Such an apology was made on 7 July 2001 by the then Polish president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, during a ceremony commemorating the mass murder of Jewish residents of the town of Jedwabne done by dozens of Poles in July 1941. Aleksander Kwaśniewski said then: "Today, as a man, as a citizen, and as President of the Polish Republic, I apologise. I apologise on behalf of myself and those Poles whose conscience is shattered by that crime. On behalf of those who think that you cannot be proud of the greatness of Polish history and, at the same time, cannot feel the pain and shame for the evil done by Poles to others".

13. As an example let us recall the events that took place shortly after the plane crash at Smoleńsk, when Polish-Russian relations and, nationwide, Polish-Polish relations seemed to have entered into a new phase of truce and reconciliation. A similar situation took place after the death of the Pope, when not only politicians were ready to reconcile, but also the fans and supporters of football teams.

nor what is necessary to make a long-term effort matter. It mainly serves to make a good impression, thus it serves the aims of the rhetorician's purpose of self-presentation or, following Plato (*Gorgias*), what can be called flattering the tastes of the crowds. In that sense it is set on evoking feelings of pleasure and improving the audience's sense of well-being. And this rhetoric, called by Gadamer (2003: 65) an "empty" rhetoric or "hollow" rhetoric, is nothing else but sophistry. Thus it is only a set of actions aimed at persuading or winning over the opponent, no matter whether we believe in what we are trying to convince others about or not. Therefore, on one hand, there is the rhetoric of reconciliation as that type of actions that merely and temporarily hides still existing conflicts; while on the other hand, there is the possibility of such a rhetoric that is capable of transforming both participants of the dialogue. In this type of rhetoric, the speaker tries to convince the Other not in the name of the speaker's own particular interests, but in the name of what the speaker believes in. In this case, that belief focuses on reconciliation. And this, in turn, takes us to the final feature of the rhetoric of reconciliation – to the rhetorician as the subject.

In ancient times the rhetorician had to be a moral person, one who sought the truth, one who served what was just and good. According to Plato (*Gorgias* 487), a person who could judge other people's actions had to possess three features: knowledge, amiability and openness. The rhetoric of reconciliation requires the inclusion of these features into the speaker's ethos. Only a person who is wise, just and believes in the existence of truth and knowledge guarantees that the rhetoric of reconciliation will not stop at the short-term results and at the particular aims of the speaker, but that it has a chance to delve deeper, to aims and values that are more durable and connected with areas of not only knowledge, but also of ethics and truthfulness. The latter is understood, of course, not as a statement that is compliant with reality, but that what is being said is compliant with the speaker's inner conviction.[14]

3. Conclusion

The rhetoric of reconciliation, though not a leading one for contemporary society, plays a very important role in it. It leads to a consensus, allows for a compromise, a rebuilding of relationships and construction of good relations. As for

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14. This issue remains in line with Socratic and Platonic rhetoric.

the issue that was raised in the introduction, it must be said that it does not always enjoy as good a reputation as it deserves, for it has strong competition in the form of the "empty" rhetoric. The difficulty in distinguishing between the rhetoric of reconciliation and the "empty" rhetoric (sophistry) consists in, among others, the near impossibility of distinguishing them exclusively on the basis of what they teach. It seems, therefore, that the essential differences can mainly be brought down to two, which are very fine and difficult to estimate: a difference in intentions and a difference in effects. The difference in intentions relates to the attitudes and intentions of the rhetorician and the ethical issues and goals to be attained: are we therefore convincing because of what we believe in or perhaps in the name of self-interest? Do we care about the truth, about what is just and right, or rather the effect, self-presentation and pandering to the audience? Do we want to take possession of or rather respect the Other? The difference in effects, in turn, can be expressed by the words from the Bible: "By their fruits ye shall know them." The "empty" rhetoric exhausts itself in immediate and impressive gestures (without a follow-up). The rhetoric of reconciliation aims at activities that will last for years or even decades to come.

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Retoryka pojednania

W artykule podejmowana jest problematyka funkcjonowania w dyskursie publicznym retoryki nastawionej na porozumienie i szukanie konsensusu, nazwanej retoryką pojednania. Warunkami retoryki pojednania są: 1) określona sytuacja retoryczna – sytuacja konfliktu, który może być postrzegany jako to, co istniało od zawsze, a zatem leży u źródeł jakichś relacji, albo traktowany jest tylko jako etap w historii relacji, który nastąpił po czasie zgody i jedności; 2) otwarcie na dialog, który wymaga w pierwszej kolejności określenia siebie, swojej tożsamości, wytyczenia granic i dalej – uznania odrębności Innego; 3) język empatii, pozwalający zredukować stopień defensywności w dochodzeniu do porozumienia.; 4) etos mówcy, oparty na wiedzy, życzliwości i otwartości. Ważnym elementem retoryki pojednania są gesty otwarcia, a więc takie znaki, zachowania zarówno werbalne, jak i niewerbalne, które wyrażają gotowość do dialogu i porozumienia. Retorykę pojednania należy jednak odróżnić od retoryki „pustej" (sofistyki), która sprowadza się tylko do takich gestów. Różnica między nimi dotyczy intencji – postawy i nastawienia retora, kwestii etycznych i stawianych celów. Retoryka „pusta" wyczerpuje się tylko w doraźnych i efektownych gestach, retoryka pojednania podejmuje wysiłek działań obliczonych na lata lub nawet dziesiątki lat.

Słowa kluczowe: spór, retoryka pojednania, dialog, język empatii

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RHETORICAL APPROACHES TO ACADEMIC WRITING: THE CASE OF POLISH AND ANGLO-AMERICAN ACADEMIC WRITING

This paper sets out to report a lack of unified norms and standards for academic writing between Polish and Anglo-American writing traditions which hinders academic communication and limits the process of socialization of students into rhetorical conventions of their academic disciplines, and ultimately creates cross-cultural, rhetorical discord. The issues of linear and digressive paths of thought development, variation in form and content, as well as reader-writer responsibility will be addressed to demonstrate that disparate rhetorical standards for academic discourse, if not implemented into academic curricula, generate biased views, attribute incorrect intentions and consequently, lead to miscommunication.

Key words: rhetorical patterns, comparative studies, reader/writer responsible languages, linearity/digressiveness

1. Introduction

In the world of academia, academic writing is conducted in a variety of forms and text types which demonstrate strong disparities across disciplines, discourse communities and, most importantly, cultures. Its complex and multifaceted nature remains a central topic and a subject of extensive research and debate in applied linguistics and is becoming an area of research interest in a range of disciplines. Since academic writing is an integral part of academic discourse, the explanation of the term *discourse* is necessary to gain a fuller understanding of the phenomenon. The word discourse originates from Latin *discursus* ("dialogue," "dissertation," "reasoning") and in the European-American rhetorical tradition has acquired the following meanings quoted in Polish Scientific Publishers dictionary: "a discussion about scientific subjects," "an argument conducted according to strictly logical reasoning," "a process of reasoning aimed at a cognitive objective through indirect thought operations, different from

observation or intuition" (author's translation). Today the discussions about the meaning and function of discourse in academia center on the communicative purpose, which includes textual, interactional and contextual considerations of texts.

Teun A.van Dijk (1997: 5) characterizes discourse as "language use" as well as … the communication of beliefs, or a form of social interaction … related to the social context." Polish academic discourse studies, primarily based on the principles of structure and content laid down by Michael Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, were also influenced by van Dijk's concept of discourse. This happened mainly due to the publications of his works in a literary journal *Pamiętnik Literacki* at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s and his later textbook *Dyskurs jako struktura i proces* (2001) which provided an integrated description of three main dimensions of discourse (text-interaction-context).

Context, today, undoubtedly plays a fundamental role in the description and explanation of academic discourse. However, it is no longer defined as an "objective" social variable such as age, social background or gender. Van Dijk (2008) argues that it is not the social situation itself that shapes the organization and content of a text and a talk, but rather the definition of relevant properties of a communicative situation by discourse participants. Van Dijk has adopted the theoretical notion of *context model* from social psychology to account for mental constructs which function as subjective interpretations of communicative situations (contexts). "Contexts are like other human experiences – at each moment and in each situation such experiences define how we see the current situation and how we act in it" (van Dijk 2008: x). Along the same lines, James Paul Gee (2012: 159) observes, "The individual instantiates, gives voice and body to a Discourse every time he or she acts or speaks, and thus carries it, and ultimately changes it, through time." The investigation of how exactly a text and a talk depend on and influence such contexts creates new areas for research in discourse studies in all disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.

My definition of academic discourse has been strongly influenced by van Dijk's and Gee's theories. By academic discourse I understand a manifestation of an author's identity shaped by interests, values, beliefs and practices of particular social groups with whom the writer identifies and also by the writer's personal experiences and unique personality features.

An important context-bound variation of the expression level of discourse is culture. While academic writing across cultures consists of a similar mixture

of text types and genres, such as research papers, grant proposals, academic essays, drafts or article reviews, the disparities between intellectual styles and writing conventions that academic writers subscribe to have been the subject of debate and controversy. For example, the latest book by Luciana de Olivera and Tony Silva (2013) includes several case studies which describe the complexity of literacy identities of second language writers and explores the conflicts and tensions that emerge when a student's literacy history does not fit into the dominant models for understanding academic writing. "Discourse differences may either be cooperatively and tolerantly accepted or give rise to misunderstanding and conflict, and even to dominance, exclusion and oppression of the less powerful. Hence, the study of intra- and intercultural communication is an important domain of a multidisciplinary [and multicultural] discourse analysis" (van Dijk 1997: 21).

Drawing on the culture-bound differences in academic writing instruction between Polish and Anglo-American traditions, this paper sets out to demonstrate that the text organization employed by Polish authors is systematically different from the one utilized by Anglo-American writers. Although there is some internal variation in the Anglo-American writing tradition (e.g. Current -traditional rhetoric, Expressivism, Cognitivism, Critical pedagogy or Post--structuralism), Current Traditionalism despite its many flaws remains dominant among pedagogies of writing instruction in the U.S. It mainly happens because the routines established and accepted by Current Traditionalism have allowed for the instruction of large groups of students at one time, holding them to the same grading criteria. Conversely, in the Polish tradition, as Anna Duszak (1997: 28) reports, "exercises in creative writing replace the English drill in step-by-step instruction in the production of expository and argumentative texts. The ability to produce academic prose is viewed more as an art than a skill to be mastered through observation and practice."

As Anna Duszak (1997) and Zofia Golebiowski (1998) have observed, cross--cultural differences between Polish and Anglo-American academic writing styles mainly affect such aspects of discourse organization as linearity and digressiveness in form and content development, levels of explicitness and metatextual cuing as well as degrees of redundancy and distribution of salience. These disparities in textual organization create different audience expectations with regard to the degree of responsibility a writer has to take for clear and well-organized statements.

A logical consequence of these discrepancies in intellectual styles and academic writing conventions between Polish and Anglo-American writing traditions is the existence of different standards regarding what constitutes proper academic writing in each culture.

2. The rhetorical study of written discourse

Since local diversity and global connectedness confront us on a daily basis, it is easy to argue that the need for attention to how we navigate rhetorically within and across cultures has never been greater. Today, however, it seems hardly possible to come to consensus on the definition of *rhetoric*, which Aristotle defined as "the ability to see in any given case, the available means of persuasion" (1991: 1355b26); which Cicero described as "the art of speaking well – that is to say, with knowledge, skill and elegance" (1942: 115) and which Edward Corbett referred to as "the art of discourse, an art that aims to improve the facility of speakers or writers who attempt to inform, persuade, or motivate particular audiences in specific situations" (1990: 1). However, for the purposes of effective academic communication, I subscribe to the opinion of other theorists, e.g. David Russell and Wilhelm Windelband, who as Jakub Lichański (2007: 19) observes, define rhetoric not as the art of persuasion, but as "proper rules of thinking" which allow for meaningful interaction. To support his point, Lichański (2007: 19; author's translation) presents the description of the field by Russell who "divided rhetoric into two parts: the history of rhetoric and the system/theory of rhetoric. It means that *rhetoric* – understood as a theory of *rhetoric* – is a coherent theory of composing with respect to the analysis of any texts." This line of thinking derives from the fifteenth century definition of rhetoric by Tardif, who was the first modern theorist to assert that the main objective of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to speak well, which in a broader sense, as Lichański (2007: 20) explains, means also to write well.

Modern rhetoric, beginning as early as in the seventeenth century, has found a closer connection between language and thought, discourse and knowledge, than ancient predictions supposed. The new perspective on language and nature of academic written communication views rhetoric as the role of discourse which determines how language is used to persuade, to convince and to elicit support (Hyland 2009: 210). For an insightful and valid evaluation of how the art of rhetoric is applied today in the practice of written discourse, it is critical

to examine specific knowledge of the cultural context surrounding a rhetorical text. It is a challenge, however, to conduct culturally contextualized study of rhetoric and to compare academic texts across cultures without static and reductive oversimplifications about the use of rhetoric by various cultures. Thus, there has been a call for an in-depth study of how writing across cultures is tied to the rhetorical history of these cultures.

3. Major contrastive textual studies

Contrastive rhetorical research was launched by Robert Kaplan in 1966 through his study in which he contrasted the linear pattern of the English paragraph structure with the organization of paragraphs in Semitic, Oriental, Romance, and Russian languages. Kaplan, by attributing logic to culture, argued that neither logic nor rhetoric is universal but unique in each culture, at a specific moment of its development. His studies focused on the paragraph as a unit of text and thought and demonstrated that a good command of sentence level features of a language does not automatically translate into a command of discourse level features involved in constructing a text. Therefore, he discredited both linguistic theories of the 1950s and the 1960s, which focused on the sentence as a basic unit for language analysis, and Aristotle's rhetoric, which saw the word as a basic unit of discourse. Today, Ulla Connor (2004a: 1), who has extended Kaplan's work to consider patterns of cultural differences when writing language, sees contrastive rhetoric as a discipline which "examines differences and similarities in writing across cultures."

As text is one of three main dimensions of discourse, John Hind's (1987) division of languages into writer- and reader-responsible was a valued contribution to contrastive rhetoric research. Hinds, who analyzed organizational structures of Japanese and American newspaper articles, proposed a new language typology based on the orientation that charges the reader with interpretative responsibility, unlike the one which places responsibility on the writer. His later contribution to contrastive rhetoric research was his 1990 study in which he investigated the deductivity and inductivity of style on the basis of Japanese, Chinese, Thai, Korean, and English writing and discerned a tendency for Oriental texts to be inductive and for English texts to be deductive.

Although Hind's works raised a lot of controversy (Paul McCagg 1996, Andy Krikpatrick 1997, Ray Donahue 1998, Ryuko Kubota and Al Lehner 2004), they

undoubtedly illuminated the new area of research: reader/writer reciprocity. The rigorous application or arbitrary use of such constituents of writer responsibility as explicit thesis statement, deductive text organization, use of sufficient transitions, precise and concise language and unity of paragraphs affects the patterning of academic text and makes writing either reader- or writer- friendly.

Of special interest to the author of this article are the comparative studies carried out by Johan Galtung (1985) and Michael Clyne (1987) because their findings, among other things, point to the differences in writing styles between Anglo-American and German intellectual traditions. Duszak (1994: 63) argues that largely under the influence of Clyne, digressiveness began to be seen as a potential style marker in academic environments that show linguistic and historical compatibilities with German. This concerns above all Czech, Russian and Polish styles of scientific exposition.

According to Galtung (1985), intellectual history determines the writing style of a given culture. He asserts, for example, that varying levels of linearity in academic writing styles result from the differences between four major writing conventions: (1) linear (Anglo-American, "Saxonic" style), (2) digressive (German, "Teutonic" style extending to languages such as Polish, Czech, and Russian), (3) circular (Oriental, "Nipponic" style) and (4) digressive-elegant (Romance languages, "Gallic" style). Galtung also finds that "… while 'Saxonic' style facilitates dialogue, scholars influenced by 'Teutonic' intellectual styles discourage dialogue, by participating in a cryptic and elitist monologue-type academic prose" (Golebiowski, 1998: 68).

Galtung's observations were confirmed by Clyne (1987) who described several disparities in discourse patterns between Anglo-American and German writing conventions. He investigated the linear organization of academic papers and articles written by English-speaking and German-speaking linguists and sociologists. Galtung compared textual hierarchy, symmetry of text segments, argument development and uniformity of formal structures. His findings have shown that texts written in German by scientists of German educational background tend to be more digressive, asymmetrical, demonstrate discontinuity in argument, and contain less metalanguage to guide the reader than texts written by their English-speaking counterparts. Clyne (1987) explains that the differences in communication styles and the organization of a written work are culturally determined.

Světla Čmejrková's and František Daneš's (1997) comparisons of Czech and

Anglo-American academic writing styles demonstrate substantial differences in form and style between these two rhetorical conventions. Although the focal point of their study is Czech academic writing, their findings are also relevant for Polish academic discourse since it draws on the same intellectual tradition as Czech. It has been reported that Czech academic writing is characterized by a delayed purpose (the thesis statement is not typically expressed in the introductory paragraph), an ornamental style and a multiplicity of viewpoints.

Since contrastive rhetorical studies have been severely criticized for the promotion of the Anglo-American monoculture, the original version of the contrastive theory has been considerably modified and today exists in a form of *intercultural rhetoric*. Connor (2011) discusses three pertinent components of the new theory: "(1) texts in contexts, (2) culture as a complex interaction of small and large cultures, and (3) texts in intercultural interactions" and explains them in the following way: "(1) the study of writing is not limited to texts but needs to consider the surrounding social contexts and practices; (2) national cultures interact with disciplinary and other cultures in complex ways; and (3) intercultural discourse encounters – spoken and written – entail interaction among interlocutors and require negotiation and accommodation" (Connor, 2011). The theory of *intercultural rhetoric* focuses on both *cross-cultural studies* (analysis of the same concept or theme in two respectively different cultures) and *studies of interactions* (interactive communication situations in which writers of different race, ethnicity, nationality, and religion negotiate meaning and style in the writing and speaking process).

The role of contrastive rhetorical research is critical in intercultural academic communication as it facilitates the understanding of writing conventions among various discourse and disciplinary communities, and makes academics sensitive to socio-cultural differences in intellectual traditions and ideologies.

3.1. Polish-English contrastive studies

The earliest Polish/English comparative studies were the outcome of a contrastive project headed by Jacek Fisiak and carried out at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poland. However, as the volume *Contrastive Linguistics and the Language Teacher* (Fisiak 1981) demonstrates, they are predominantly focused on sentence-level analyses, leaving textual studies for further research. What is more, Golebiowski (1998: 68) argues that they do not offer a comprehensive

picture of rhetorical differences between Polish and English writing conventions "Textual features . . . often have cultural origins which transcend sentence limits and cannot be explained in terms of syntactic differences."

Significant contribution to Polish/English contrastive studies which center on broader perception of discourse, i.e. textual organization patterns, has been made by Duszak (1994, 1997) and Golebiowski (1998, 2006).

Duszak (1994) compared Polish and English research articles from the field of language studies. She found that English authors presented their ideas in a direct, assertive, positive, and explicit manner while Polish authors expressed their thoughts in indirect, affective, and tentative statements. Furthermore, Polish writers tended to adopt defensive positions as if they anticipated potential criticism and questions. Duszak's study confirmed Anna Wierzbicka's findings (1991) which revealed similar differences between Polish and Anglo-Australian communication patterns.

Studies by Duszak (1997) and Golebiowski (1998) concentrate on digressiveness which has been classified as a predominant style marker of Polish academic writing. While it is present in English texts, it has met with less tolerance in the Anglo-American writing culture. In the Polish academic tradition digressions from the main track of reasoning are not only justified but even encouraged as "products of an inquiring mind" (Duszak 1997: 323), which reveals the main purpose of Polish academic texts: demonstration of an author's knowledge. This attitude counters the objectives of an Anglo-American writer, who wants to establish a successful communication with the reader and views digressions as signs of "an unfocused and rambling style" (Duszak 1997: 323).

In order to address cultural constrains that affect writers' stylistic choices, Duszak (1997) used Galtung's (1985) typology of intellectual styles in academic writing to analyze digressiveness in English ("Saxonic") and Polish ("Teutonic") traditions. The Saxonic style is said to characterize a low-context pattern of argumentation in English and corresponds to Kaplan's linear organization of paragraph development in this language. Writers have a clear purpose and are direct and positive in their formulas. The Saxonic intellectual approach features explicit messages and relies on literal meanings of words which proves a general reader-friendliness of academic writing in this culture: the audience is addressed directly and is guided by "landmarks along the way" (Hinds 1987: 67). These landmarks are transition words that help the reader follow the writer's logic. This stylistic feature contrasts with the Teutonic style, characteristic for the German

language and spreading to such languages as Polish, Czech and Russian (Duszak 1997: 324), which is weak on thesis and strong on theory formation, features flowery and wordy style, and digressive argumentation strategies which put heavy demands on the reader's processing abilities.

Duszak (1997: 328) divides digressions in Polish academic texts into two major groups: digressions proper and elaborations. In what follows, she describes "digressions proper" as "discourse segments which are low in thematic relevance to what is in focus" that may "range from single phrases to entire paragraphs." She calls elaborations "thematic inserts that delude the focus." To her, they are additional meanings that appear in a text as explications, amplifications restatements, reformulations, clarifications to what has already been previously said or implied. Both digressions proper and elaborations contribute to a higher level of redundancy in a text.

The study carried out by Golebiowski (1998) points out to different preferences for linear or digressive progressions in how ideas are developed in Polish and Anglo-American academic texts. The text corpus consisted of the introductory sections of articles published in professional psychological journals written in English and Polish by Polish scholars. Golebiowski (1998: 74) has identified the following reasons for digressions in the introductions examined:

> (…) to present background information; to review previous research in terms of rhetorical and empirical evidence; to consider various theoretical and philosophical issues; to develop and clarify concepts; explain terminology; and to justify the author's own research or methodology. Authors tend to enter into scholarly discussions, introduce their own philosophy or ideology, or explain why other issues have not been covered or explored.

The functions of digression identified by Golebiowski are similar to the following findings of Clyne's research (1987: 227) on digressiveness in German academic writing: to provide theory, ideology, "qualification" or additional information, or to enter polemic with another author.

In her 2006 study, Golebiowski investigated three articles from the field of sociology written by (1) several English-speaking writers within their native academic discourse community, (2) a native speaker of Polish for English discourse community and (3) a Polish-speaking author for her native discourse community. Łukasz Salski (2012: 116) provides the following commentary of Golebiowski's findings:

> She discovered that native English authors take special care to 'guide the reader through the argument and order of discoursal argumentation;' advance organizers and other organizational relationships are used as a substitute for dialogue with the audience. On the contrary, the text written by a Polish author for the Polish audience resembles a monolog, in that the author seems to be more concerned with demonstrating knowledge rather than ensuring the readers' understanding.

Golebiowski's (2006) conclusions confirmed the results of her earlier study that content and form are not equally valued in the Polish rhetorical tradition because "the evidence of the possession of knowledge is considered far superior to the form in which it is conveyed" (Golebiowski 1998: 85). Both studies demonstrated that Polish academic discourse features "branching" progressions in the development of ideas whereas the Anglo-American rhetorical tradition values clarity in the organization of thoughts and shows sensitivity to the reader's needs.

Other researches, e.g. Ronald White (2001) and Salski (2007), also conducted studies on the dichotomy between the writer's and the reader's responsibility in Polish and English academic texts and came up with similar observations.

Hind's (1987) division of languages into writer- and reader-responsible is often discussed under dialogic versus monologic formula, or expository versus contemplative preferences in academic narration (Čmejrková and Daneš in Duszak 1997). Anglo-American academic writing features a dialogic formula which, interactive by nature, facilitates a reader/writer communication by ensuring the reader's guidance and discourse predictability, and hence makes an academic text reader-friendly. This attitude contrasts with what Duszak (1997: 13) calls "contemplative rhetoric," which is attributed to Polish scientific prose, drawing on the "Teutonic" tradition. Polish academic writers are expected to "indulge more in acts of creative thinking" and charge the reader with the interpretation of the writer's intent. "It is possible that the Polish style is less reader friendly and promotes an elitist attitude to knowledge, deliberately excluding outgroups" (Golebiowski 1998: 85)

In the study on the reader-writer reciprocity in Polish and English written discourse Salski (2007) identified the following constituents of the writer's responsibility in an Anglo-American academic text: explicit thesis statement, deductive text organization, use of sufficient transitions, precise and concise language and unity of paragraphs which contrast with text characteristics that make Polish academic discourse reader-responsible: inductive text organization, arbitrary paragraphing without topic sentences, wordy and vague style, and frequently

missing transitions (Salski 2007: 256-258).

On the basis of research conducted in the field of Polish-English comparative studies, it has been recognized that Polish and Anglo-American academic texts differ significantly in their level of reader/writer interactivity. Polish academic culture, subscribing to the "Teutonic" intellectual tradition, features a rather impersonal style of academic discourse since such reader-friendly devices as advance organizers, signposting (presence of transitions), careful and logical paragraphing or use of precise and concise vocabulary are rare in Polish texts. As Duszak (1997: 18) points out, "instead, intellectual effort is required, and readiness for deep processing is taken as an obvious prerequisite for engagement in academic discourse". This makes academic texts written by Poles complex, incoherent, and difficult to read for native English speakers. Thus, negotiation and emergence of compatible standards for the levels of interactivity in academic discourse may open, as Clyne, Hoeks, and Kreutz (1988) observed, the processing barriers that obstruct the integration of otherwise accessible contexts.

4. Conclusions

It is therefore assumed that Polish academic writing draws on three major themes: the intellectual history of the country, a cultural value orientation and the dominant style of academic discourse. It is only natural that matters of high importance to the Anglo-American writing culture, such as deductive text organization or use of concise and precise language, are not relevant to Polish academic writers. The major disparity between these two academic approaches pertains to the purpose and the method of communicating content. Polish academic writers, in contrast to their English-speaking colleagues, value the depth and the richness of their works more than a clearly structured form. Anglo-American writers demonstrate a preference for a coherent and structured organization of a text in order to ensure that its meaning is fully understood.

The dynamic development of discourse research in the United States has no equivalence in Poland. Textual studies hardly exist in Poland which may be explained by the reluctance of Polish writers to adhere to a rigorously organized discourse pattern. Therefore, there is a lack of unified norms and standards for academic writing between Polish and Anglo-American writing cultures, which hinders the exchange of academic thought and obstructs the process of socialization of students into rhetorical conventions of foreign academic disciplines.

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Kontrastowe konwencje retoryczne w polskich i amerykańskich tekstach akademickich

Celem tej pracy jest ujawnienie braku zunifikowanych norm i standardów rządzących kompozycją tekstów akademickich w polskiej tradycji dyskursu pisemnego. Utrudnia to nie tylko międzynarodową komunikację akademicką, która oparta jest na amerykańskiej, linearnej strukturze tekstu, ale również proces socjalizacji studentów w retorycznych konwencjach ich dyscyplin naukowych. Autorka omawia różnice między polskim i anglo-amerykańskim tekstem akademickim wynikające z odmiennych tradycji intelektualnych. Dowodzi, iż brak uwzględnienia międzykulturowych różnic retorycznych prowadzi do błędnej interpretacji intencji autorów, zaburzając w konsekwencji akademicką komunikację.

Słowa kluczowe: wzorce retoryczne, badania komparatywne, języki przyjazne lub mniej przyjazne czytelnikowi, linearność/dygresyjność

Jakub Z. Lichański

THE POLISH TRANSLATION
OF HERMOGENES OF TARSUS

Hermogenes, *Retoryka*, tł., opr., wstęp Henryk Podbielski, wyd. nauk. KUL, Lublin 2012, 2⁰, ss. 614.

Hermogenes of Tarsus (fl. late 2nd century) is the most important of the Greek rhetors; in the *Suda* Encyclopedia in E 3046, we read[1]:

> Hermogenes, an old man among boys and a boy among old men.' But aged about 18 or 20 he wrote these books, laden with marvels: *Art of Rhetoric*, which is in everyone's hands;

Henryk Podbielski, who is a translator and editor of the Aristotle's *Opera Omnia*, has just translated *The Art of Rhetoric* by Hermogenes into Polish. For several reasons this publication is a historical event. Firstly, next to the French, this is the second complete translation of *Corpus Hermogeneum* into modern language. It was preceded by several translations: Latin (complete translation and translations of individual treatises), Russian (translations of individual treatises) and English (translations of individual treatises). Secondly, the introduction to the volume and to individual treatises is the first comprehensive study about the rhetoric of Hermogenes in Polish language.

I will not be referring to the translation itself. It is great, though a few small things require improvement. These are proofreading errors, or stylistic awkwardness, but they do not affect the understanding of the text. What draws my main interest is the introduction, or rather introductions to individual books of *Ermogénous téchne rhetoriké*. Together they represent the first such comprehensive introduction to *The Art of Rhetoric* by Hermogenes in Poland.

The merit of Podbielski's reading of the theory is beyond doubt. The author refers suggestively both to Hermogenes' ideas and to the views of other researchers. Nevertheless, I think that in some areas his attention could be more comprehensive. This mainly concerns two issues: the reception of Hermogenes'

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1.   Cf. *Suda*, E 3046, transl. Malcolm Heath, http://www.stoa.org/sol/ (2013-05-16).

ideas and the reading of the Hermogenes' status theory. For instance, the in-
formation which is missing is that during the Renaissance Hermogenes' ideas
had been known, among others, in Poland, and they were applied in education[2].
What is more, we owe it to the fact that Ioannes Sturm translated and published
one of Hermogenes' treatises. The Latin translation of Ioannes Sturm from 16th
century and Gaspar Laurentius from 1614 should also be noted[3]. They played
a significant role in the reception of Greek rhetorical ideas in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century's Europe.

As regards the issues concerning the analysis of the status theory the major
drawback is the lack of references to the work of Richard Volkmann and his
comments appearing in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*[4]. Although
the same commentary of Podbielski is obviously correct, the lack of confronta-
tion with the secondary literature is a huge shortcoming. Yet even more impor-
tant is the question of the contemporary reception of Hermogenes' ideas. This
reception includes among others the problems of the composition of written
texts, but also issues related to the argumentation. Now Hermogenes' theory of
status raises considerable interest, mainly for practical use in legal argumenta-
tion[5]. Classical rhetoric is thus not only a subject of historical research, but has
a practical significance, which is worth emphasizing.

My final reservation with this edition is the absence of indexes: of names and
subjects. In this way, the use of this volume is difficult. Yet since Hermogenes
requires careful reading, and besides, we have the other editions, this is only
a minor discomfort. However, what truly undermines the book's effectiveness
is the absence of the index for the Greek-Polish terms. This omission should
be blamed on the publisher who did not take care of the follow-up book. The
readers are familiarized with the Greek terms in the introductions and in the

2.   Cf. St. Kot, *Wojciecha z Kalisza Szkoła lewartowska*, "Archiwum do Dziejów Literatury I Oświaty w Pol-
sce", t. XIII, Kraków 1914; T. Conley, *Byzantine Culture in Renaisance and Baroque Poland*, Warsaw 1993;
J.Z. Lichański, *Retoryka: Historia – Teoria – Praktyka,* Warszawa 2007, v. I, p. 164.

3.   Cf. Hermogenes, *Partitionum rhetoricarum liber unus … scholis explicatus … a Ioanne Sturmio*, ed. Ioan-
nes Cocinus, Argentina 1570; G. Laurentius, ed., *Ermogénous téchne rhetoriké…*, Geneve 1614.

4.   Cf. R.E. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht dargestellt,* Leipzig
1885, pp. 33-92; M. Hoppmann, Statuslehre. In: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Tübingen 2007, Bd.
8, col. 1327-1358.

5.   Cf. H. Hohmann, *The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetorical Theory and Modern Legal Argumentation*,
"American Journal of Jurisprudence" 34, 1989, pp. 171-197; M. Carter, *'Stasis' and 'Kairos': Principles of So-
cial Construction in Classical Rhetoric*, "Rhetoric Review" nº 7, 1998, pp. 97-112; H. Hohmann, *Stasis*. In:
T.O. Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, Oxford 2001, pp. 741-744.

text of the treatises of course, but this information is not sufficient for the study of Hermogenes.

Nevertheless, despite the critical comments I regard this edition of *The Art of Rhetoric* as an important event. Podbielski has made a great contribution to the assimilation of the Greek rhetorical tradition to Polish language and culture.

Helena Cichocka

NOWE SPOJRZENIE
NA RECEPCJĘ DRUGIEJ SOFISTYKI

Thomas Schmidt, Pascale Fleury (ed.), *Perceptions of the Second Sophistic and Its Times / Regards sur la Seconde Sophistique et son époque. Phoenix supplementary volumes, 49.* Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2011, pp. xx, 273.
Niels Gaul, *Thomas Magistros und die spätbyzantinische Sophistik. Studien zum Humanismus urbaner Eliten in der frühen Palaiologenzeit,* Mainzer Veröffentlichungen zur Byzantinistik 10, Harrasowitz Verlag Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 500.

Intelektualny prąd przełomu I, II i III wieków (ok. 50 – ok. 250) nazwany przez jednego z jej najważniejszych przedstawicieli, Filostrata, drugą sofistyką, jest zazwyczaj postrzegany przede wszystkim jako zjawisko literackie i kulturowe, którego podstawowy element stanowi retoryka; ale przecież literaturę i sztukę tej epoki przenikają także inne tematy oraz wartości kulturowe, jak *paideia*, *mimesis*, gloryfikacja przeszłości, ocena pozycji i znaczenia Aten, a także problematyka greckiej tożsamości. Najważniejsza jednak wydaje się odpowiedź na pytania, jak intelektualne elity pierwszych wieków naszej ery postrzegały siebie samych, jak były przyjmowane przez późniejsze generacje oraz jakie opinie możemy o nich wydawać ze współczesnego, nowożytnego punktu widzenia. Odpowiedź na te pytania znajdujemy w omawianej tu najnowszej publikacji poświęconej recepcji drugiej sofistyki, zawierającej materiały z konferencji, która odbyła się na Université Laval (Québec), we wrześniu 2007 roku. Uczestniczyli w niej zarówno znawcy literatury oraz filologii, jak i przedstawiciele językoznawstwa, historii, politologii, socjologii oraz religioznawstwa.

Materiały konferencji podzielone zostały na pięć tematycznych sekcji: **1) Istota i praktyka drugiej sofistyki**[1] – sekcja ta obejmuje: a) szeroko rozumianą problematykę dotyczącą *Żywotów sofistów* Filostrata[2], eksponującego, zdaniem

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1. *The essence and the presence of the Second Sophistic*
2. Przekład polski: Flawiusz Filostratos, *Żywoty sofistów*, przełożył, wstępem i komentarzem opatrzył Marian Szarmach, Toruń 2008, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, pp. 147

A. Kemezisa[3] centralną rolę Rzymu jako idealnego centrum dla uprawiania aktywności sofistów; b) artykuł I. Hendersona który ukazuje normy określone przez Filostrata dla intelektualnej elity, determinujące jej socjalny prestiż i oddziaływanie; autor zwraca także w tym kontekście uwagę na szczególne znaczenie wymowy popisowej; c) szczegółową analizę zależności między sofistyką a filozofią przeprowadzoną w artykule D. Côté[4], gdzie zwraca się uwagę na opozycję między kulturą (*paideia*) i naturą. **2) Mówca i jego portret[5]**: a) P. Fleury analizuje[6] paralelizm zachodzący między retoryką i religią, traktując mówcę i wyrocznię jako swego rodzaju ideologiczną „konstrukcję" charakterystyczną dla okresu drugiej sofistyki; b) kontynuacja problematyki religijnego wymiaru retoryki znajduje się w artykule J. Downie[7], która powołuje się na Eliusza Arystydesa porównującego mówcę z atletą, uwypuklając tym samym fizyczny aspekt deklamacji retorycznej oraz jej rytualny charakter; c) artykuł A. Pasquier[8] nawiązuje w porównawczej analizie do *Protreptyku* Klemensa Aleksandryjskiego i *Obrazów* Filostrata do tradycji pierwszej sofistyki wieków V i IV p.n.e., eksponującej funkcję natury w retoryce. **3) Przeszłość i tożsamość Greków[9]**: a) T. Schmidt przedstawia[10] relację o barbarzyńcach zawartą w pismach Diona Chryzostoma, w której można dostrzec pewnego rodzaju solidarność z nimi, a także krytyczny stosunek do imperialistycznych poglądów Trajana; tego typu intelektualna otwartość umieszcza jednak Diona, zdaniem autora, poza ruchem sofistów; b) refleksje nad grecką tożsamością poprzez analizę używania przez Atenajosa terminów *Hellenikos* i *barbarikos* w *Uczcie mędrców*, przedstawia artykuł M.-H. Mainguy[11]; c) J. Auberger ukazuje w swym artykule[12] złożoność stosunku Pauzaniasza do drugiej sofistyki, który nie podziela bynajmniej

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3. Adam Kemezis, *Narrative of Cultural Geography in Philostratus's Lives of the Sophists*, pp. 3 – 22.

4. Dominique Côté, *L'Héraclès d'Hérode: héroïsme et philosophie dans la sophistique de Philostrate*, pp. 36 – 61.

5. *Orator and his image*

6. Pascale Fleury, *L'orateur oracle: une image sophistique*, pp. 65 – 75.

7. Janet Downie, *Portrait d'un rhéteur:Aelius Aristide comme initié mystique et athlète dans les Discours sacrés*, pp. 76 – 86.

8. Anne Pasquier, *Une écriture du visuel au temps de la Seconde Sophistique: Clément d'Alexandrie (Protreptique) et Philostrate (Images)*, pp. 87 – 101.

9. *The past and Greek identity*

10. Thomas Schmidt, *Sophistes, barbares et identité grecque: le cas de Dion Chrysostome*, pp. 105 – 119.

11. Marie-Hélène Mainguy, *Reflets de l'hellénisme chez Athénée à travers l'emploi des termes hellenikos et barbaros*, pp. 120 – 132.

12. *Text, tradition and performance*

sofistycznego idealizowania klasycznych Aten; jego „greckość" jest, zdaniem autora, bardziej globalna, czyli bardziej „rzymska". 4) **Tekst, tradycja i przekaz**[13]: a) K. Schlapbach analizuje w swym artykule[14] zależność między tańcem i wypowiedzią zachodzącą w *Zagadnieniach biesiadnych* (9. 15) Plutarcha; w przeciwieństwie do dawnej koncepcji jedności poezji i tańca Plutarch, zdaniem Schlapbacha, w odpowiedzi na współczesne mu prądy – przypisuje tańcowi jedynie funkcję obrazu; b) S. Gurd koncentruje uwagę na praktyce publikowania tekstów w czasach mu współczesnych[15], które dzieli na przeznaczone do publikacji oraz nie przeznaczone do publikacji wprowadzając przez to rozróżnienie rodzaj hierarchii czytelników na podstawie stanu ich wiedzy oraz dostępu do poprawnych tekstów poprawionych przez samego autora. Zarówno Plutarch jak i Galen nie są zazwyczaj zaliczani do kręgu autorów drugiej sofistyki, jednak w oczywisty sposób poruszają, co wykazali autorzy powyższych artykułów, problematykę z nią związaną. 5) **Dziedzictwo i oddziaływanie drugiej sofistyki**[16]: a) przegląd recepcji tradycji drugiej sofistyki u wybranych autorów IV wieku rozpoczyna artykuł J. Vanderspoela[17], który wykazuje, że twórczość Eliusza Arystydesa była dobrze znana w latach 350-tych; w okresie wcześniejszym o ich znajomości świadczy przede wszystkim twórczość Libaniusza i Temistiusza; b) wątek ten podejmuje także D. Johnson[18] wykazując naśladownictwo *Eleusinios logos* Arystydesa w *Monodii na spalenie się świątyni Apollona w Dafne* (or. 60) Libaniusza, który w odpowiedni sposób przystosował swój wzorzec do czasów mu współczesnych; c) artykuł Ch. R. Raschle[19] zawiera analizę ewolucji tradycyjnego toposu tyrana w VII mowie Temistiusza, powstałej w 366 roku; Raschle określa tę mowę jako połączenie panegiryku i *logos presbeutikos* wskazując w niej na nowe elementy odnoszące się do rzeczywistości politycznej późnego cesarstwa.

Jak wynika z powyższego przeglądu, większość artykułów zawartych w tomie konferencji poświęconej recepcji drugiej sofistyki analizuje jej literackie aspekty, natomiast część autorów zwraca uwagę na jej aspekt antropologiczny

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13. *Text, tradition and performance*
14. Karin Schlapbach, *Dance and Discourse in Plutarch's Table Talks 9*. 15, pp. 149 – 168.
15. Sean A. Gurd, *Galen on ekdosis* pp. 169 – 184.
16. *Heritage and influence of the Second Sophistic*
17. John Vanderspoel, *Were the Speeches of Aelius Aristides 'Rediscovered' in the 350s p.c.?*, pp. 187 – 198.
18. Diane Johnson, *Libanius' Monody for Daphne (Oration 60) and the Eleusinios Logos of Aelius Aristides*, pp. 199 – 215.
19. Diane Johnson, *Libanius' Monody for Daphne (Oration 60) and the Eleusinios Logos of Aelius Aristides*, pp. 199 – 215.

oraz niejako osadza ją w kontekście politycznym stanowiącym grecko-rzymską syntezę epoki[20].

Powiązanie tradycji drugiej sofistyki z tradycją bizantyńską, a w szczególności z literaturą oraz kulturą późnego Bizancjum okresu panowania Paleologów[21], znajduje swój wyraz w przeprowadzonej (i opublikowanej w tym samym roku – 2011) przez Nielsa Gaula szczegółowej i wieloaspektowej analizie twórczości Tomasza Magistra[22], bizantyńskiego leksykografa i gramatyka, autora niezwykle interesujących z punktu widzenia teorii oraz praktyki retoryki mów i listów, a także nieco mniej znanych traktatów teologicznych. Większość studiów nad Tomaszem Magistrem koncentrowała się dotychczas wokół jego twórczości jako filologa, natomiast dopiero niezwykle obszerna, pierwsza w literaturze przedmiotu, publikacja Gaula ukazuje Tomasza Magistra przede wszystkim jako zainspirowanego przez retorykę sofistów humanistę późnego Bizancjum, czynnie uczestniczącego w życiu politycznym cesarstwa. Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje tutaj eksponowanie przez autora monografii pozycji sofisty w państwie jako retora-polityka oraz wszechstronna analiza znaczenia drugiej sofistyki dla społeczeństwa bizantyńskiego początków XIV wieku.

Pierwsza część monografii Gaula zatytułowana: *Późnobizantyńska sofistyka*[23] zawiera wnikliwą analizę wielu aspektów socjologicznych, historycznych i kulturowych życia elit za panowania dynastii Paleologów. Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje rozdział piąty[24] części pierwszej publikacji, w którym autor uzasadnił znaczenie recepcji drugiej sofistyki w twórczości Tomasza Magistra, a tym samym jej wpływ na społeczeństwo cesarstwa bizantyńskiego późnego Bizancjum. Część druga monografii Gaula[25] ukazuje, przy zachowaniu porządku chronologicznego, bizantyńskiego humanistę jako nauczyciela i uczonego oraz retora i mnicha.

Monografia Nielsa Gaula jest pionierskim, niezwykle obszernym studium nad praktyką i teorią retoryki późnego Bizancjum. W nawiązaniu do tradycji klasycznych pokazuje w nowym świetle funkcję i znaczenie drugiej sofistyki –

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20. cf. Bryn Mawr, Classical Review 2012. 03. 03: rev. by Alexander V. Makhlayuk.
21. XIII/XIV w.
22. ur. ok. 1275, zm. ok. 1346
23. cf. pp. 17 – 210: *Die spätbyzantinische Sophistik*.
24. cf. pp. 121 – 168: *Das Erbe der zweiten Sophistik*.
25. cf. pp. 213 – 370: *Thomas Magistros: Bios und Ēthos*.

przeniesionej m. in. przez Tomasza Magistra na grunt tradycji bizantyńskiej. Wieloaspektowe analizy zawarte w monografii Gaula pozwalają nam właściwie używać nowatorskiego terminu „trzecia sofistyka" w odniesieniu do procesu przyswajania sobie przez literaturę oraz kulturę Bizancjum założeń „drugiej sofistyki" zarówno w teorii jak i w codziennej praktyce życia publicznego.

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